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Abstract
We discuss how standard computable equilibrium models of trade policy can be enriched with selec-
tion effects. This is achieved by estimating and simulating a partial equilibrium model that accounts
for a number of real world effects of trade liberalisation: richer availability of product varieties; tougher
competition and weaker market power of firms; better exploitation of economies of scale; and, of course,
efficiency gains via firms selection. The model is estimated on EU data and then simulated in counter-
factual scenarios. Gains from trade are much larger in the presence of selection effects with substantial
variability across countries and sectors.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the ensuing collapse of manufacturing, the temptation of
protectionism looms on the path to recovery (Evenett, 2010; WTO, 2010). The welfare losses from pro-
tectionism are well understood and some have been known for a couple of centuries: protectionism breeds
inefficiency. By doping the price mechanism, protectionism distorts the allocation of resources forcing con-
sumers to buy from cost ineffective producers and countries to be active in industries in which they have no
cost advantage. By focusing firms on their domestic markets, protectionism also prevents the exploitation
of scale economies and reduces the variety of both final and intermediate products available to consumers
and producers. Finally, by promoting the market power of local firms, protectionism fosters their rents and
wasteful rent-shifting activities.
Though the principles are well understood, as protectionist pressure mounts it is becoming increasingly
crucial to give a sense of the order of magnitude of the costs of protectionism and, symmetrically, of the
benefits of free trade. Along the years, this has been the objective of a vast literature that has tried to
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put numbers on the predictions of theoretical models of trade policy (see, e.g., Piermartini and Teh, 2005,
for a recent survey). Its main tools are computable partial and general equilibrium models based on two
methodological pillars. On the one hand, the idea is that policy analysis cannot but benefit from the logical
rigour and consistency of theoretical models. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the issues analyzed,
often involving a multiplicity of linkages among a plethora of economic players, are so complex that they
cannot be solved by relying only on a model in the analyst’s head or a simple diagram. Computer-based
models are then used to track such complex interactions and, through simulation, answer ‘what if’ type of
questions concerning the effects of trade policies.
Compared with the state of the art in international trade theory, the main limitation of that literature is
its current neglect of firm heterogeneity, which implies that only scale economies drive endogenous changes in
productivity within sectors.1 In recent models with heterogeneous firms trade liberalization has, instead, an
additional positive impact on sectoral productivity through the selection of the most efficient firms (Bernard
et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003). The reason is a combination of import competition and export market access.
On the one hand, as lower trade costs allow foreign producers to target the domestic markets, the operating
profits of domestic firms in those markets shrink whatever their productivities. On the other hand, some
domestic firms gain access to foreign markets and get additional profits from their foreign ventures. These
are the firms that are productive enough to cope with the additional costs of foreign activity (such as those
due to transportation and remaining administrative duties or institutional and cultural barriers). The result
is the partition of the initially active domestic firms in three groups. As they start making losses in their
home markets without gaining access to foreign markets, the least productive firms are forced to exit. On
the contrary, as they are able to compensate lost profits on home sales with new profits on foreign sales,
the most productive firms survive and expand their market shares. Finally, firms with intermediate levels of
productivity also survive but, not being productive enough to access foreign markets, are relegated to home
sales only and their market shares fall. Since international trade integration eliminates the least productive
firms, average productivity grows through the reallocation of productive resources from less to more efficient
producers.
This mechanism found empirical support in early firm-level analyses that tried to identify the direction of
causation hidden in the positive correlation between the export status of a firm and its productivity (called
‘exceptional exporter performance’ by Bernard and Jensen, 1999). This is a crucial issue for trade policy.
Causation going from export status to firm performance would reveal the existence of ‘learning by exporting’
1See, e.g., Smith and Venables (1988), Haaland and Norman (1992). As argued by Tybout and Westbrook (1996), the
neglect of firm heterogeneity implies that scale effects may be overstated. On the one hand, exporting plants are typically the
largest in their industry, so they are not likely to exhibit much potential for further scale economies exploitation. On the other
hand, large plants also account for most of the production in any industry, so foregone economies of scale due to downscaling
in import-competing sectors are also likely to be minor.
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and, therefore, call for export promotion. However, apart from peculiar cases concerning developing countries,
most of the evidence supports reverse causation in the form of ‘selection into export status’: firms that already
perform better have a stronger propensity to export than other firms (Tybout, 2003). Selection comes with
two additional effects that are consistent with the theoretical argument discussed above. First, exposure to
trade forces the least productive firms to shut down (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw
et al., 2000). Second, trade liberalization leads to market share reallocations towards the most productive
firms (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006). On both counts, aggregate average productivity improves. In
the last few years a burgeoning empirical literature has confirmed those early results.2
The empirical relevance of the selection effect motivates additional efforts towards quantifying the cor-
responding gains from trade as a preliminary step towards their integration in the large-scale computable
general equilibrium models used for policy analysis. This line of research has been heralded by Tybout (2003)
and pursued by Bernard et al. (2003). These authors calibrate and simulate an oligopolistic model with
heterogenous firms obtained by introducing Bertrand competition in the probabilistic Ricardian framework
developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002).3 Aggregate U.S. production data and trade data on the 47 leading
U.S. export destinations (including the U.S. itself) are used to calibrate the model’s parameters governing
geographic barriers, aggregate technology differences, and differences in input costs. U.S. plant level data
are used, instead, to calibrate the parameters that relate to the heterogeneity of goods in production and
consumption. The calibrated model is then used to assess the impacts of various counterfactual scenarios.
The counterfactual analysis by Bernard et al. (2003) has the merit of showing for the first time how to
provide a quantitative assessment of the selection effect of trade liberalization in the spirit of computable
equilibrium models. It neglects, however, a few important dimensions of the effects of trade policy highlighted
by both theoretical and empirical research. First, in the model of Bernard et al. (2003) the equilibrium
distribution of firm markups is invariant to country characteristics and to geographic barriers. This removes
an important source of cross-country variation in the selection effects and is not consistent with empirical
evidence showing that markups do vary across firms and markets (Tybout, 2003).4 Second, Bernard et al.
(2003) assume that firms’ entry does not respond to market profitability. This removes an important channel
2Recent evidence on the existence of causation from trade to aggregate income and productivity is provided by Frankel and
Rose (2002), who find per capita income to be positively affected by the formation of currency unions, thanks to their positive
impact on trade, and by Alcala` and Ciccone (2004), who report strong support for a positive causal effect of trade on labour
productivity. With respect to our analysis, Alcala` and Ciccone (2004) provide the interesting insight that, at the aggregate
level, such a positive causation mainly acts through total factor productivity.
3See also Finicelli et al. (2009) for a calibration and simulation of the perfectly competitive model by Eaton and Kortum
(2002) as well as Waugh (2010) for a variant of the same model with traded intermediates and non-traded final goods.
4More precisely, Bernard et al. (2003) do generate markups that are variable at the firm level differing (in a statistical
sense) between exporters and non exporters. It is the overall distribution of markups that is unchanged. However, the overall
distribution of markups is seldom observed as one would need to include non-traded sectors in particular. In this respect, it
could be argued that the findings in Tybout (2003) do not necessarily contradict their prediction.
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through which industry equilibrium is eventually restored and gives the model a strong short-run flavour.5
The aim of the present paper is to supplement the analysis by Bernard et al. (2003) suggesting how
standard computable equilibrium models of trade policy can be enriched with selection effects without
missing other important channels of adjustment. This is achieved by estimating and simulating a partial
equilibrium model derived from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This model accounts for a number of real
world effects of trade liberalisation: richer availability of product varieties; tougher competition and weaker
market power of firms; better exploitation of economies of scale; and, of course, efficiency gains via the
selection of the most efficient firms.6 The model is estimated on E.U. data and simulated in counterfactual
scenarios that target several dimensions of European integration. Simulations show that the gains from
trade are much larger in the presence of selection effects.7 The gains from freer trade are, however, unevenly
distributed between and within countries. Small, competitive and centrally located countries are those who
benefit the most. Within countries, the main beneficiaries are the border regions located closer to the core
of the European market. In other words, geography plays a key role in determining the distribution of gains
across European regions.
How should our results be read? First of all, simulations of computable equilibrium models are not
forecasts. As pointed out by Piermartini and Teh (2005), a forecast involves predicting the future values
of the endogenous variables in the model making assumptions on the likely evolution of all its exogenous
variables. Simulations concern, instead, hypothetical counterfactual scenarios whose investigation is not
necessarily wedded to a particular view about the likelihood of the exogenous variables changing in a certain
way. However, their usefulness in understanding complex and sometimes unexpected interactions in an
economy should not be underestimated. As shown by Ottaviano et al. (2009) in their investigation of the
selection effects of the euro based on the methodology developed in the present paper, the simulation of
computable equilibrium models is often the only way to give a sense of the order of magnitude of policies
when data unavailability prevents econometric investigation.
Second, we use a computable partial equilibrium model. As such it focuses only on a part of the economy
(manufacturing) abstracting from the impact of that part on the rest of the economy and vice versa. Because
it does not take into account the link between factor incomes and expenditures, our partial equilibrium model
cannot be used to determine income, whereas general equilibrium models can. In this respect, our model
5Markups are constant also in the CES models by Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008).
6Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009) test the implications of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for the dynamics of prices,
productivity and markups as functions of openness to trade at a sectoral level. Using disaggregated data for EU manufacturing
over the period 1989-1999, they find evidence that trade openness exerts a competitive effect, with prices and markups falling
and productivity rising.
7As we will discuss, there is no obvious way to estimate the preference parameters. Hence, we are not able to assess the
quantitative impact of counterfactual scenarios on the number of firms and, therefore, on overall welfare. Nevertheless, in the
theoretical model indirect utility turns out to be positively correlated with average productivity irrespective of the number of
firms.
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should be seen as an additional ”application” for existing general equilibrium models that currently neglect
neglect firm heterogeneity.
Third, in our simulations we adopt a comparative statics approach that examines how a change in policy
changes the endogenous variables. Accordingly, we are concerned with discerning the difference between the
initial and final equilibrium of the economy and not with the transition required to move from the former
to the latter. An obvious limitation of this approach is that it may fail to capture some of the costs and
benefits associated with the transition and so misstate the costs and benefits of a policy change. Dynamic
models of international trade are, however, an exception both in theoretical and applied research.8
Fourth and last, we estimate our model on the European Union. This is mainly due to the fact that
comparable firm-level panel data across a large set of countries is available only for Europe. While computable
equilibrium models are not forecasts, they are clearly more valuable the more accurate their calibration and
simulation are. An important methodological contribution of the present paper is to shows how to structurally
estimate several parameters of the model combining macro and micro data. In addition, the focus on a set
of sufficiently integrated countries, which are relatively homogeneous in terms of economic development and
institutions, allows us to control for several confounding factors that may blur the working of selection effects
in more heterogenous data sets.
The rest of the paper is organized in five additional Sections. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 describes estimation and validation. Section 4 simulates alternative scenarios. Section 5 discusses the
robustness of the simulated results. Section 6 concludes. Additional details on the data and estimation
procedure are provided in two separate Appendices.
1 Theoretical Framework
The model is based on the one proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) that we apply to a partial equilibrium
framework and extend to allow for international differences in factor prices and entry costs.
1.1 An Industry Model
Consider an industry that is active in M countries, indexed l = 1, ...,M . Country l is endowed with given
amounts of labour Ll and capital Kl.9 Both labour and capital are geographically immobile. The output of
the industry is horizontally differentiated in a large set of varieties and we call N l the measure (‘number’)
of varieties sold in country l. Following Ottaviano et al. (2002), the inverse demand function of a generic
8See Costantini and Melitz (2008) and Arkolakis (2010) for two recent exceptions.
9In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) labour is the only factor of production. Even though we will take factor prices are exogenous,
we introduce two factors for consistency with the procedure we will follow to estimate productivity.
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variety i in country l is linear and given by:
pl(i) = α− υq
l(i) + ηQl
Ll
(1)
where pl(i) and ql(i) are the price and the quantity of variety i while Ql ≡ ∫ N l
0
ql(i)di is the total quantity of
the differentiated good. Parameters α and η are positive and measure the intensity of the preference for the
differentiated good: the larger α and the smaller η, the higher the vertical intercept of the linear demand.
The parameter υ is also positive and measures the degree of product differentiation among the varieties of
the differentiated good: the larger υ, the flatter the linear demand.
We define average price and average quantity of varieties sold in country l as ql ≡ Ql/N l and p¯l ≡(
1/N l
) ∫ N l
0
pl(i)di respectively. Then (1) implies the simple average relation ql = (α− p¯l)/(υ + ηN l). This
can be used to substitute for Ql = N lql in (1) to show that variety i is demanded (i.e. ql(i) > 0) provided
that its price is low enough
pl(i) ≤ υα+ ηN
lp¯l
ηN l + υ
≡ pl. (2)
For given pl(i), this condition holds if consumers like the differentiated good a lot (large α and small η),
varieties are very differentiated (large υ), the average price p¯l is high, and the number of competing varieties
N l is small. In all these circumstances the price elasticity of demand εl(i) ≡ {[pl/pl(i)]− 1}−1 is low.
Market structure is monopolistically competitive and each variety is supplied by one and only one firm.
In particular, the demand function (1) implies that firms do not interact directly. However, they do interact
indirectly through an aggregate demand effect as shown by the presence of Ql. Thus, though each firm
is negligible to the market, when choosing its output level it must figure out what the total output of the
industry will be. In other words, a firm accurately neglects its impact on the market but must explicitly
account for the impact of the market on its profit.
All firms use the same technology employing labour and capital as their inputs but are heterogeneous in
terms of efficiency in their usage. Different efficiency stems from different ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP).
Specifically, the technology of a generic firm based in country l is described by the following Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale:
ql(c) = c−1xl(c) (3)
where c is the firm’s inverse TFP, which we call ‘unit input requirement’ (UIR), while xl(c) = kl(c)βK ll(c)βL is
the Cobb-Douglas composite input of capital kl(c) and labour employment ll(c) with factor shares βK+βL =
1 respectively. As in traditional Heckscher-Ohlin models, we assume that factor shares are the same across
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countries.
It will turn out to be convenient to index each firm by its UIR. Accordingly, technology (3) implies that
firm c producing in country l faces marginal cost
ml(c) = Bωlc (4)
where B ≡ (βL)−βL(βK)−βK is a positive constant and ωl ≡
(
zl
)βK (
wl
)βL
is the exact price index of the
composite input xl(c) with w and z denoting the wage and the rental price of capital respectively.
Firm heterogeneity is modelled as the outcome of a research and development process with uncertain
outcome. In particular, in order to enter the market, each firm has to make an irreversible (‘sunk’) investment
in terms of labour and capital to invent its own variety. The investment is equal to F l = ωlf l as we assume
that it entails the same factor proportions as subsequent production. A prospective entrant knows for certain
that it will invent a new variety and use a Cobb-Douglas technology like (3). It does not know, however,
its efficiency, as this is randomly assigned only after the sunk cost has been payed. In particular, upon
entry each firm draws its c from a common and known distribution Gl(c), with support [0, clA], which varies
across countries. The upper bound of the support clA determines the upper bound of the marginal cost
mlA ≡ ml(clA) = BωlclA. If
(
mlA,s/m
l
A,r
)
<
(
mhA,s/m
h
A,r
)
, relative to entrants in l, entrants in h are more
likely to get lower marginal cost draws in sector r than in sector s. In this sense, countries h and l can be
said to have a (probabilistic) comparative advantage in sectors s and r respectively.
National markets are segmented. Nevertheless, firms can produce in one country and sell in another by
incurring a per-unit trade cost. We interpret such cost in a wide sense as resulting from all impediments to
trade. Specifically, the delivery of a unit of any variety from country l to country h requires the shipment
of τ lh > 1 units, where (τ lh − 1) is the frictional trade cost. We also allow for costly trade within a country
with τ lh > τ ll ≥ 1.
Since the entry cost F l is sunk, only entrants that can cover their production and trade costs survive and
produce. All other entrants exit without even starting production. Survivors maximize their profits facing the
demand function (1) taking the average price p¯l and number of competitors N l as given. Since we assume that
national markets are segmented and production faces constant returns to scale, firms independently maximize
the profits in each country they sell to. Let pilh(c) denote the maximized value of the profits that sales to
country h generate for firm c located in country l. Let plh(c) and qlh(c) denote the corresponding profit-
maximizing price and quantity. Then, they must satisfy pilh(c) =
[
plh(c)− τ lhml(c)] qlh(c) and qlh(c) =(
Lh/υ
) [
plh(c)− τ lhml(c)].
Only firms earning non-negative profits in a market will choose to serve that market. This implies that
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the decision whether to serve a market or not obeys a cutoff rule. For example, firm c producing in country
l will not serve country h if the cost of producing and delivering a unit of its variety is larger than the
maximum price consumers in h are willing to pay. Given (2), that is the case if τ lhml(c) > ph. Hence,
only firms in country l that are efficient enough (i.e. have a low enough c) will serve country h. Let mh
denote the marginal cost inclusive of trade frictions faced by a producer in country h that is just indifferent
between serving its local market or not. Then, by definition, we have mh = ph. Since firm c producing in
country l serves country h when τ lhml(c) < mh, does not serve it when τ lhml(c) > mh, and is indifferent
when τ lhml(c) = mh, we call mh the ‘cutoff cost’ in country h.
A useful property of our setup is that all performance measures of firm c in a certain market can be
written as simple functions of the cutoff cost. In particular, independently of any specific assumption on the
distribution Gl(c), profit maximizing price and quantity evaluate to:
plh(c) =
1
2
[
mh + τ lhml(c)
]
(5)
qlh(c) =
Lh
2υ
[
mh − τ lhml(c)] (6)
with corresponding markup and profit
µlh(c) =
1
2
[
mh − τ lhml(c)] (7)
pilh(c) =
Lh
4υ
[
mh − τ lhml(c)]2 . (8)
Moreover, if one is ready to make specific assumptions on Gl(c), also industry-level performance measures
can be simply linked to the cutoff cost. While Combes et al. (2008) have shown that the model is theoretically
tractable for any Gl(c), our empirical implementation requires us to impose a specific parametrization, whose
empirical relevance will then be tested. In particular, we assume that firms draw their efficiency from a Pareto
distribution implying
Gl(c) =
(
c/clA
)γ
=
[
ml(c)/mlA
]γ
with c ∈ [0, clA]. (9)
The shape parameter γ is the same in all countries and indexes the dispersion of draws. When γ = 1, the
distribution is uniform on [0, clA]. As γ increases, density is increasingly concentrated close to the upper bound
clA. As γ goes to infinity, the distribution becomes degenerate at c
l
A. The theoretical appeal of (9) comes
from the fact that any truncation of Gl(c) from above maintains its distributional properties. For instance,
the distribution of firms producing in l and selling to h is given by Glh(c) =
(
c/clh
)γ
, with c ∈ [0, clh], where
clh ≡ mh/(Bωlτ lh) is the UIR of the producer in country l that is just indifferent between serving country
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h or not.
1.2 Industry Equilibrium
Firms choose a production site l prior to entry and sink the corresponding entry cost F l = ωlf l. Free entry
then implies zero expected profits in equilibrium:
M∑
h=1
[∫ clh
0
pilh(c)dGl(c)
]
= F l (10)
One can, therefore, derive the equilibrium cutoff costs for the M countries by substituting (8) into (10) and
solving the resulting system of M equations for l = 1, ...,M . This yields:
mh = Φ
(
rh/Lh
) 1
γ+2 (11)
where Φ ≡ [2υ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)] 1γ+2 is a positive bundling parameter, while
rh
(
P,ψ1, ..., ψM
) ≡ ∑Ml=1 ∣∣Clh∣∣ψl|P | (12)
measures the ‘remoteness’ of country h.
To see why rh is a measure of remoteness, consider its various components. First, |P | is the determinant
of a matrix P whose element in row l and column h is ρlh ≡ (τ lh)−γ ∈ (0, 1] with corresponding cofactor∣∣Clh∣∣. Being inversely related to the trade cost parameter τ lh, ρlh measures the ‘freeness of trade’ from
country l to country h. Henceforth, we will refer to P as the ‘trade freeness matrix’. Second, the bundling
parameter ψl ≡ f lωl (mlA)γ captures various exogenous determinants of country l’s ability to generate low
cost firms: low factor prices ωl, low entry cost f l and low probability of inefficient draws by entrants (low
mlA) all foster the creation of low cost firms. Hence, for given ψ
l’s, rh is large when high trade barriers
separate country l from its trading partners. Viceversa, for given trade barriers, rh is large when the trading
partners of country l tend to generate high cost firms.
The information provided by ψh has to be compared with that conveyed by the cutoff cost mh. In
particular, ψh captures the exogenous ability of country h to generate low cost firms abstracting from the
size of its domestic market Lh and its remoteness rh. The cutoff cost mh determines, instead, the endogenous
cost of producers in country h that survive a selection process in which market size and remoteness play key
roles. For this reason, we will refer to ψh and mh as inverse measures of, respectively, the ‘exogenous’ and
the ‘endogenous’ competitiveness of country h. Section 2.3 will show that the endogenous competitiveness
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and the exogenous competitiveness of a country can be pretty different.
According to (11), a larger local market and closer proximity to countries with high exogenous competi-
tiveness reduce mh, thus decreasing the average cost of producers in country h. To see this, note that, under
the distributional assumption (9), the average marginal cost of firms selling in country h (inclusive of trade
frictions) equals
mh =
γ
γ + 1
mh (13)
Hence, a percentage change in the cutoff cost causes an equal percentage change in the average marginal
cost. Result (13) follows from the fact that the average cost of firms selling to country h from any country l is
the same whatever the country of origin: mh ≡ [1/Gl(clh)] ∫ clh
0
τ lhml(c)dGl(c) for any l (h included). This
property holds for all other average performance measures of firms selling in country h, which can therefore
be expressed as simple functions of mh. In particular, average markups, prices, quantities and operating
profits evaluate to:
µh = 12(γ+1)m
h, p¯h =
2γ + 1
2 (γ + 1)
mh
qh = L
h
2υ(γ+1)m
h, pih =
Lh
2υ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)
(mh)2 (14)
where the average of a performance variable zlh(c) is defined as zh ≡ [1/Gl(clh)] ∫ clh
0
zlh(c)dGl(c). Thus,
a smaller cutoff cost generates smaller average costs, smaller average markups and lower average prices for
varieties sold in h. As the average cost and the average markup are both multiples of mh, a percentage
change in the cutoff has the same percentage impact on both the average markup µh (‘pro-competitive
effect’) and the average delivered cost mh (‘selection effect’). Through these channels, a given percentage
change in the domestic cutoff translates into an identical percentage change in the average price. Finally,
average quantities and profits are multiples of mh and (mh)2 respectively: a percentage change in mh causes
the same percentage change in average quantity and a percentage change in profit in the same direction but
larger in size.
Also the number of varieties sold in country h can be expressed as a simple function of the local cutoff
cost. This can be shown by solving (2) for Nh after substituting ph = mh and p¯h from (14) in order to get:
Nh =
2υ(γ + 1)
η
α−mh
mh
(15)
which points out that a reduction in the cutoff cost leads to an increase in the number of varieties sold.
Finally, given the demand function (1), the surplus of a consumer in country h can also be written as a
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simple function of the cutoff cost:
U l =
1
2η
(
α−mh)(α− γ + 1
γ + 2
mh
)
(16)
Note that, due to the law of large numbers, profits exactly match the entry cost not only ex ante in expected
values, as implied by the free entry condition (10), but also ex post in average values. Specifically, we
can write
∑M
h=1G
l(clh)pih = F l as Gl(clh) is not only the ex ante probability of successfully selling from
country l to country h but also the ex post fraction of entrants in l that serve h. This allows us to take
consumer surplus (16) as a measure of welfare generated by the industry. Then (16) implies that welfare is
a decreasing function of the cutoff cost due to the three concurrent effects: a lower cutoff entails a larger
number of varieties, a lower average price (thanks to both lower average cost and lower average markup),
and a higher average quantity.
2 Estimation
Our aim is to estimate and simulate our model industry by industry in order to investigate the effects of trade
frictions in different thought experiments. As just shown, a key feature of our model is that the cutoff costs
in the different countries are sufficient statistics for industry performance. This allows us to focus only on
their percentage changes in the different experiments with respect to a benchmark estimation. Specifically,
each thought experiment will propose a counterfactual scenario affecting the trade freeness matrix and hence
countries’ remoteness. If we call P∗ the counterfactual trade freeness matrix and rh∗ the corresponding
remoteness, then (11) implies the percentage cutoff change due to turning P into P∗ equals
(
mh∗ −mh
)
/mh =
[(
rh∗
) 1
γ+2 − (rh) 1γ+2 ] / (rh) 1γ+2 (17)
which maps exogenous remoteness changes into endogenous competitiveness changes showing that the exact
value of the industry-specific constant Φ is immaterial.
For our benchmark estimation we focus on 18 manufacturing industries across 29 countries in the year
2000. Our data set is detailed in Appendix B. We choose 2000 because of the quality of the data and the
fact that no major economic change took place in that specific year. On the one hand, 2000 is prior to both
the adoption of the paper euro and the large fluctuations of its US dollar exchange rate that could have
biased our results. On the other hand, in 2000 the effects of the Single Market had been already felt after
eight years since its creation in 1992.
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The 18 industries are listed in Table 15. Each industry is modeled as in the previous Section and we do
not consider any interaction among them. We include all EU-15 countries (except Luxembourg), and further
consider Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway,
Poland, Taiwan, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the US as the ‘rest of the world’ (henceforth RoW). In 2000 our
18 industries accounted for 19.4% of EU-15 GDP. In that year trade among EU-15 countries accounted for
59.2% of their imports and 58% of their exports, while trade between the EU-15 and the RoW accounted
for an additional 23% (22.4%) of EU-15 imports (exports). Data limitations prevent us from including some
interesting countries such as some of the new accession countries that joined the EU after 2000 or China.
However, in 2000 China represented only 3.2% of the imports and 1.6% of the exports of EU-15 countries.
By (11), the structural parameters needed to compute the benchmark country-and-industry specific cutoff
cost mh (up to the industry-specific constant Φ) are: the industry specific shape parameter γ, the country
specific matrix of trade freeness P , and the country specific exogenous competitiveness parameters ψl. As
we are interested in percentage cutoff changes, we do not need to estimate Φ and, therefore, υ. To recover
all other parameters, we proceed industry by industry in three steps:
1. For P , we estimate gravity equations using data on trade flows and distance.
2. For γ, we use firm-level data to recover this parameter from a regression that exploits the features of
the distributional assumption (9).
3. For ψl, we first derive the cost cutoff mh in each country from data on price aggregates. We then
use (11) to back out the country values of ψl consistent with the values of P , γ and mh derived in
the previous steps. Specifically, once inverting (11), we compute the set of exogenous competitiveness
values that make the remoteness rh of each country h satisfy:
(
mh
)γ+2
Lh = Φγ+2rh
(
P,ψ1, ..., ψM
)
(18)
up to the constant Φγ+2. Making use of bootstrap techniques applied to the first two steps, we finally
provide confidence intervals for the estimated ψl.
2.1 Trade Freeness Matrix (P )
In the first step of the benchmark estimation procedure, the trade freeness matrix is estimated through
standard gravity regressions. We start with showing that our theoretical framework indeed yields a gravity
equation for aggregate bilateral trade flows. Calling N lE the number of entrants in country l, the number of
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exporters from l to h equals N lEG
l(clh). Each exporter c from l to h generates f.o.b. export sales equal to
plh(c)qlh(c). Then, aggregating over all exporters yields the aggregate exports from l to h. These, by (5),
(6) and (9), evaluate to:
T lh =
1
2υ (γ + 2)
ρlh
(
mlA
)−γ
N lE
(
mh
)γ+2
Lh (19)
which is a gravity equation in so far as it determines bilateral exports as a (log-linear) function of bilateral
trade barriers and country characteristics. In particular, (19) reflects the combined effects of market size,
technology, and geography on both the number of exporters (the so called ‘extensive margin’ of trade) and
the amount of exports per exporter (the so called ‘intensive margin’ of trade). It shows that a lower cutoff
cost in the country of destination dampens exports by cutting both margins.10
In equation (19), the only term that depends on both l and h is ρlh. Following the abundant gravity
literature, Head and Mayer (2004) assume, when estimating trade freeness between European countries, that
ρlh = (dlh)δ exp(θB + θLB Lang
lh + θCB Cont
lh) if l 6= h and ρlh = (dlh)δ if l = h, where dlh is the distance
between l and h, θB is a coefficient capturing the fall in exports due to crossing the l-h border (the so called
‘border effect’), Langlh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l and h share a common language, and
Contlh is a dummy variable indicating contiguity between l and h. In other words, as is standard in the
gravity literature, trade costs are a power function of distance, while crossing a border, not sharing the same
language or not being contiguous impose additional frictions.
However, in our gravity regression we consider many countries outside Europe and one of our goals is
precisely to measure the different degree of trade freeness between the EU-15 block and the RoW. Fur-
thermore, as pointed out in Disdier and Head (2008), the elasticity of trade with respect to distance (δ)
is usually different depending on whether the trading partners belong to the same continent or not. In
order to be both parsimonious and obtain precise estimates, we introduce an additional distance component
(dlh)δ
SCSClh , where SClh is a dummy that takes value one if both l and h belong to the same continent,
and further assume that θB = θ
W
B + θ
EU
B EU
lh, where EU lh is a dummy that takes value one if both l and
h belong to the EU-15. The two parameters θWB and θ
EU
B broadly account for differences in impediments to
internal and external EU-15 trade flows, while δSC controls for the different rate of trade decay with distance
within and across continents.
As for the other terms in equation (19), these depend either on the origin country only [N lE(m
l
A)
−γ ],
or on the destination country only [
(
mh
)γ+2
Lh], or are constant [1/(2υ (γ + 2))]. As in Hummels (1999)
and in Head and Mayer (2004), we can isolate the effects of these country-specific terms using dummies for
origin (exl) and destination (imh) countries. This approach avoids the specification problems discussed by
10See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Helpman et al. (2008), and Chaney (2008) for similar results derived from different models.
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Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and produces parameters that are very similar to those obtained using
their multilateral resistance terms to control for remoteness. Thus, our estimating gravity equation is
T lh = exl imh (dlh)δ (dlh)δ
SCSClh exp
([
θWB + θ
EU
B EU
lh + θLB lang
lh + θCB cont
lh
]
bordlh
)
lh (20)
where bordlh is a dummy variable that equals one whenever l 6= h. Our reference year is 2000 but, to get
more precise parameter estimates, we consider data from 1997 to 2001 and add a full set of year dummies.
The population of interest consists of the EU-15 countries plus the 15 countries representing the RoW.
A first issue to address in the estimation of (20) is how to deal with the selection bias due to presence
of zero trade flows (Helpman et al., 2008). In our case, that is not likely to be too problematic as less than
1% of trade flows are zero in our sample at the chosen level of industry disaggregation. A second issue is
that, as stressed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the standard practice of interpreting the parameters
of log-linearized models estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as elasticities can be highly misleading
in the presence of heteroskedasticity in lh. To tackle this issue, we take as our benchmark their Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator of the non-linear equation (20). In Section 4 we will argue
that our results are robust with respect to the more common strategy of estimating the log-linearized model
by OLS.
Table 1 reports the results of our PPML estimations. Overall, parameters have the expected sign and
magnitude. In particular, the average elasticity δ of trade to distance across sectors is -0.92. This value
compares with the -0.91 mean value observed by Disdier and Head (2008) in their meta-analysis of 1467
estimates referring to 103 papers. Also in line with Disdier and Head(2008), we find that the elasticity of
trade to distance is higher when considering trade within the same continent. δSC is in fact negative and
significant in 9 out of 18 cases with an average across sectors of -0.03. The most notable feature of Table 1
is the considerable heterogeneity in trade barriers across industries. Some industries, such as Textiles, and
Wearing Apparel are characterized by small distance frictions (low absolute value of δ), but high border
frictions (large absolute value of θWB ). The latter are, however, much lower for internal than external EU-15
trade (i.e. θWB + θ
EU
B has smaller absolute value than θ
W
B ). In other industries, such as Machinery and
Electric Machinery, border frictions are much smaller and it is not possible to distinguish between θWB and
θWB + θ
EU
B . The industries most affected by trade frictions include Petroleum and Coal and Printing and
Publishing, which exhibit both large distance frictions and large border frictions. Unsurprisingly, sharing a
common language is extremely important in the latter industry as revealed by its large positive θLB .
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2.2 Shape Parameter (γ)
In the second step of the benchmark estimation we obtain the shape parameter γ. Assumption (9) implies a
log-linear relationship between the cumulative distribution Gl(c) and c with γ being the slope parameter. As
such, γ can be estimated as the coefficient of a log-log regression of Gl(c) on c. If the R2 of such regression
is close to one, then (9) can be considered a fairly good approximation of the UIR distribution, which means
that the OLS coefficient of ln(c) provides a consistent estimator of the shape parameter.11
To implement this regression, we need some observable distributions of UIR across countries. The most
natural candidate for a firm UIR c is, given equation (3), the inverse of its estimated TFP, which can be
readily obtained as the Solow residual from the estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function (3) at
the firm level. At least two issues have to be addressed at this stage.
First, it is well known that a simple OLS estimation of (3) yields biased results due to simultaneity and
omitted variables. We address this issue by relying on semi-parametric methods, as suggested by Olley and
Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP). In particular, we use the
former in our benchmark analysis and present results based on the latter in our robustness checks. Since
both OP and LP assume that labour is a fully variable input, which may not be the case, we implement
the two estimations following the correction introduced by Ackerberg et al. (2006). More details on this are
reported in Appendix A.
Second, as the model assumes monopolistic competition, we need to account for heterogeneity in prices
across firms. In particular, the left hand side of (3) is the quantity sold by a firm. Theory-consistent firm
productivity (and so UIR) estimation would thus require either direct information on the quantities a firm
produces or, if only revenues or value added are available, information on quoted prices. Both types of
information are very seldom present in firm-level data sets and unfortunately our data set is no exception.12
In the literature the typical solution to such data unavailability is to rely on revenues or value added
rather than quantities to estimate a “revenue based” UIR. This is problematic when firms have market
power as in our model. To see this, consider a firm selling in its domestic market l only. When only
data on revenues pll(c)qll(c) are available, the standard practice is to consider the revenue based measure
c˜l(c) ≡ xl(c)/ [pll(c)qll(c)] = c/pll(c) as a proxy for c. As a matter of fact, this introduces a bias in the
estimate of c. Indeed, by (7), as c increases firms charge smaller markups and are, therefore, attributed a
proportionally smaller c˜l(c). A by-product of such omitted price bias, which is of particular relevance in our
analysis, is that c and c˜l(c) do not follow the same distribution. Therefore, we cannot directly apply our
11See Norman et al. (1994).
12See, e.g., Jaumandreu and Mairesse (2005) and Foster et al. (2008) for two exceptions in which information on firm-level
physical output is available.
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log-log regression procedure to the distribution of c˜l(c) in order to estimate γ.13
Luckily the structure imposed by our theoretical framework helps us by suggesting a simple correction
to be applied to c˜l(c) in order to recover an unbiased estimate of c and ultimately of γ. The correction,
detailed in Appendix A, consists of the following transformation:
cˆl(c) ≡ c˜
l(c)
2c˜l(cll)− c˜l(c) (21)
where cll refers to the marginal firm in country l (i.e. the firm that is just able to serve its domestic market
l). Appendix A shows that cˆl(c) = c/cll, entailing that this “corrected” measure of UIR is no longer affected
by the omitted price bias. Equation (21) thus shows how to transform the observable revenue based UIR
c˜l(c), with unknown distribution, into another observable variable cˆl(c) that, being equal to c/cll, follows a
distribution like (9) with the same shape γ and support [0, 1]. Hence, we can recover the shape parameter
γ by estimating c˜l(c), transforming c˜l(c) into cˆl(c), and finally using the distribution of cˆl(c) to retrieve γ.
The revenue based UIR c˜l(c) is estimated by applying (industry by industry) the corrected OP procedure
to data on value added, capital, labour, and investments drawn from the Amadeus database provided by the
Bureau Van Dijk. The Amadeus database has been extensively used in several recent empirical studies, such
as Helpman et al. (2004) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) among others. The dataset is an unbalanced
panel of 137,284 observations covering 32,840 firms active in our 18 manufacturing industries and spanning
over our group of European countries.14 The resulting labour (βL) and capital (βK) shares, are reported in
Table 2, together with the associated standard errors.15
Once obtained the distribution of c˜l(c), we estimate the shape parameter γ for each industry through
a log-log regression of cˆl(c) on its empirical cumulative distribution. Two comments are in order about
our procedure. First, being the revenue based UIR of the least productive firm, the quantity c˜l(cll) can
be mis-measured due to the presence of outliers. As known, three types of outliers are usually recognized.
Vertical outliers have outlying values on the y-axis, good leverage points have outlying values on the x -axis
but located close to the regression line. Bad leverage points are both outliers in the space of the explanatory
variables and located far from the (true) regression line. As we are more concerned with the slope parameter
13One could be tempted to conclude that these problems are specific to our linear demand structure while being not relevant
for the more frequently used CES demand with constant markups (see, e.g. Melitz, 2003). In the CES case, however, the
problem with using revenue based UIR is even worse. To see this, call σ the constant demand elasticity. Then, one obtains
c˜l(c) = [(σ − 1)/σ] (τ llBωl)−1, which is completely uninformative about c. We thank Jonathan Eaton for bringing this point
to our attention.
14We include data on Norway in the production function estimation in order to improve the quality of our results. Norwegian
data in the Amadeus are indeed of high quality in terms of firm coverage. This is unfortunately not the case for other European
countries in the dataset.
15Consistently with the theoretical framework, the estimated production function coefficients are obtained under the assump-
tion that all the European firms in a given sector use the same technology. However, we include country dummies in the TFP
estimating equation in order to allow for country-specific productivity shocks potentially correlated with labour and capital use
as well as with firm-level productivity shocks unobservable to the econometrician.
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than with the intercept, vertical outliers are less of a problem whereas it is the presence of bad leverage
points that can severely bias the slope estimate. Unfortunately, robust regression methods conceived to deal
with this issue (MM-estimators) do not provide us with the R2, which is our measure of the goodness of the
Pareto assumption. Hence, we use an M-estimator (implemented in Stata through the command ‘rreg’) that
downweights the observations with large residuals, thus avoiding the occurrence of inflated R2’s caused by
the presence of good leverage points.16
Second, equation (21) is valid for sales to a given market l and the corresponding inputs xl(c). However,
exporters may sell to different markets at different prices and a breakdown of input usage by destination
market is not available. Therefore, there might be a bias as long as export prices are systematically lower
or higher than domestic ones. This is likely to be not much of an issue as domestic sales typically represent
most of exporters’ revenues and exporters are themselves a tiny fraction of all European producers (see, e.g.,
Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). Nonetheless, we provide further evidence of this being a small problem by
comparing the benchmark estimates obtained for all European firms with those obtained for non-exporting
French firms.17
For each industry, Table 2 reports in column 4 (6) the estimated shape parameter γ and the corresponding
standard errors of the foregoing OLS regression for all European firms (French non-exporters). The high
R2’s in column 5 (7) reveal that the Pareto assumption fits well the data: the average cross-industry R2 is
0.94 (0.90) in the case of all European firms (French non-exporters).18 Concerning the γ’s, these are very
precisely estimated in all cases. A striking feature is that there is much less heterogeneity across industries
in terms of γ’s than in terms of trade costs. The two groups of estimates, obtained for all European firms
and for French non-exporters only, are not identical but the means across industries are very close: 1.79 and
1.96 respectively. Estimates of γ based on c˜l(c) in column 8 are always larger than those based on cˆl(c),
which suggests that neglecting firm heterogeneity in prices leads to the underestimation of firm heterogeneity
in productivity. This is consistent with the theoretical results in Del Gatto et al. (2008) and the empirical
evidence in Foster et al. (2008), who report a smaller standard deviation in TFP based on value added
with respect to those based on physical output. In Section 4, we will show that our results are robust to
alternative estimates of the shape parameter.
16For more details on the ‘rreg’ command see Croux and Verardi (2009).
17The choice of French firms is dictated by the very precise information about their export status in the Amadeus database.
18As large firms account for the bulk of exports and output one could think that our estimation procedure gives too much
weight to small firms. In unreported estimations, we have experimented with truncating the Amadeus data by eliminating firms
with less than 50, 100, or 250 employees, obtaining very similar values of γ. These findings further corroborate the use of the
Pareto distribution.
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2.3 Endogenous and Exogenous Competitiveness
In the third and last step of the benchmark estimation, we start with deriving the endogenous competitiveness
(i.e. the cost cutoff) mh in each country from price aggregates. We then use (18) to back out the set of
exogenous competitiveness values ψl consistent with the latter and the previously estimated values of P and
γ.
Endogenous competitiveness (1/mh). The cost cutoff can be readily obtained as a function of the
average price by rearranging the corresponding expression in (14) to yield:
mh = [2(γ + 1)/ (2γ + 1)] ph (22)
As evident from (17), the factor multiplying ph in (22) plays no role in the evaluation of counterfactual
percentage changes. Therefore, only data on average producer prices, comparable across countries at the
industry level, are needed for subsequent simulation. These are provided by EU KLEMS database, described
in Timmer et al. (2007), for 1997 at the level of Nace 2 digit classification. We convert these data from
1997 to 2000 using country-industry specific value added deflators and match our 18-industry classification
by weighing Nace 2 digit prices by the total hours worked in 2000.19 Results are listed in Table 3.
Exogenous competitiveness (1/ψh). We use (18) to derive the exogenous competitiveness values ψl,
up to a multiplicative constant, using estimates of P and γ as well as mh. We further bootstrap 200 times
the residuals obtained from the estimation of P and γ to create alternative values for trade costs and the
shape of the productivity distribution. We then use such values to solve 200 times for ψl in (18) and obtain
the distribution of each exogenous competitiveness parameter. Dots in Figure 1 represent the computed
(log) values of 1/ψl for the EU-15 with higher values corresponding to higher exogenous competitiveness.
Triangles and squares depict, respectively, the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution obtained by boot-
strapping. The Figure reveals both substantial heterogeneity across industries and, with the exception of
few cases, tight confidence intervals.
To better understand the relation between endogenous competitiveness and exogenous competitiveness,
Table 4 reports two country rankings obtained by aggregating 1/mh and 1/ψh based on the corresponding
industry production share. The fourth column shows the difference between the positions in the two rankings.
These are quite dissimilar and (11) explains why in terms of market size and remoteness. Three countries
19See Appendix B for additional details.
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with high exogenous competitiveness, namely Austria, Finland and Sweden, are too small and too peripheral
to fully exploit their potential, thus ending with a much lower endogenous competitiveness rank. By contrast,
centrally located countries, like Belgium and the Netherlands, benefit from their central geography ending
up with a higher rank in terms of endogenous than exogenous competitiveness. Finally, some large countries
like Germany and Italy owe part of their endogenous competitiveness to market size. Once discounted for
population, their exogenous competitiveness is revised downwards.
2.4 Validation
Before turning to counterfactuals, it is important to assess the extent to which our model is able to reproduce
patterns of the data that have not been directly used for its benchmark estimation. In so doing, we often
focus on France because of extended data coverage and high quality in the Amadeus database. Moreover,
we are able to complement the Amadeus data with detailed information on French manufacturing firms
provided by the database EAE (Enquete Annuelle Entreprises).20
We first compare the predictions of our model with what is actually observed in the data; then we discuss
its performance with respect to competing trade models with firm heterogeneity.
2.4.1 Comparison with the data
We focus on seven key measures: revealed comparative advantage across sectors; the goodness of fit of
structural gravity; the number of producing firms; the share of firms that export; the fraction of exporters’
revenues from exports; the size advantage of exporters; and their productivity advantage. The choice of
these measures is driven by data availability.21
Revealed comparative advantage. We start with checking whether our micro model with heterogeneous
firms generates predictions that are consistent with the received wisdom based on the concept of comparative
advantage, according to which countries tend to export goods in sectors where their production costs are
relatively low with respect to other countries. Within our framework, this implies that countries should
export goods in sectors where their cutoff costs are relatively low. To see whether this is indeed the case,
we compute the correlation between the cutoffs and a standard index of ’revealed comparative advantage’.
20See Appendix B for additional details. Figures on the size and productivity advantages of exporters do not include the
Petroleum and Coal industry as this behave as an outlier.
21Further details on how the various measures are computed from the model are available upon request.
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This index measures export specialization by industry as
RCAhs =
∑
l
Thls /
∑
l,s
Thls∑
h
∑
l
Thls /
∑
h
∑
l,s
Thls
, (23)
where the term Thls stands for export flows from h to l in industry s.
Table 5 reports the correlation across industries of RCAhs and m
h
s for a given country, with the latter
being deflated by the industry mean. Countries are expected to specialize in industries where they have
relatively lower cutoffs with respect to cross-country industry averages, leading to a negative correlation
between average producer price and revealed comparative advantage across industries. Table 5 confirms
that this is indeed the case for 10 of our 14 European countries.
Structural gravity. Our second check consists in comparing the goodness of fit between the theory-based
gravity equation (19) and a standard gravity formulation where the GDP of the origin and destination
countries are used along with measures of trade costs. The goal of such exercise is to evaluate the ability of
the underlying theory to improve our understanding of trade flows.
The problem with estimating our theory-based gravity equation is that data on the mass of entrants N lE ,
which appears in (19), are typically not available. However, to get around this problem one can build on the
structure of the model. For each sector, the number of firms producing in country l, N lP , is given by:
N lP ≡ N lEGl(cl) = N lEGl(ml/τ ll) = N lE(mlA)−γ(ml)γρll. (24)
As a result, our gravity equation can be rewritten as
T lh =
1
2υ (γ + 2)
ρlhN lP (m
l)−γ(ρll)−1
(
mh
)γ+2
Lh,
which now depends on the number of active firms N lP as well as on variables and parameters that are
available to us (γ, ρll, ml, mh, and Lh). Drawing from the UNIDO database, we have collected information
on the number of active establishments by country for our 18 manufacturing industries breakdown in the
year 2000.22 We use this information to measure N lP and estimate our theory-based gravity via PPML.
At the same time, we also estimate via PPML a standard non theory-based gravity equation in which T lh
depends on the GDP of l and h as well on our empirical specification for ρlh.
22Data are available for 27 of the 29 countries we consider (the two missing countries being Greece and Taiwan). Out of
the 486 country-industry combinations (27 countries times 18 industries), 9 combinations are missing leading to 477 available
observations on N lP .
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Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of the “size” variables (i.e. N lP and L
h for the theory-based
gravity equation and the GDP of l and h for the standard gravity equation) as well as the Pseudo R2 of the
two gravity equations. The table reveals that the results for our theory-based equation are pretty good. In
particular, in terms of Pseudo R2, the theory-based gravity equation performs at least as well as the standard
one. While the coefficients of N lP and L
h are typically below one, the same applies to those of GDP l and
GDPh and this behaviour is known to be a feature of the PPML estimator.
Number of producing firms. A third way of assessing the ability of our model to reproduce data patterns
is to compare the predicted and observed number of active firms N lP . For each industry, we use exporter
dummies coming from the benchmark gravity estimations (exl =
[
N lE(m
l
A)
−γ]) and, by using (24), we obtain
a measure for the number of active firms N lP = ex
l(ml)γρll which is consistent with our model.
Table 7 reports the estimated correlations across countries of predicted and observed number of firms.
As one can see, results are reasonably good: with the exception of “Wood products except furniture”,
correlations are all positive with the average being 0.4768.
Share of firms that export. Our fourth check targets a key prediction of our model with firm hetero-
geneity, according to which exporters are only a fraction of all firms. In 2000 the share of exporters in the
whole population of French manufacturing firms was equal to 22.26%.23 This figure can be considered as
fairly stable over time (see Eaton et al., 2008). Our model predicts that 25.01% of French firms should be
exporters.
Fraction of revenues from export. Our fifth check concerns ’export intensity’, defined as the fraction
of firm revenues coming from exports. Table 8 compares the predictions of our model on the ratio of export
revenues to total revenues with the actual distribution across French exporters. The second column, taken
from Eaton et al. (2008), shows the actual percentage of exporting French firms getting a given share of
their revenues from exports while the third columns reports predicted percentages. Our model does not
match the high share of exporters declaring small export volumes. It is, however, able to predict that quite
a few firms have very high export intensity (90 to 100%). Matching the pattern for high export intensity can
be regarded as more important than matching the pattern for low export intensity as data on small export
declarations are typically more noisy.
Size advantage of exporters. Our models with firm heterogeneity not only predicts that exporters are
a subgroup of the population of firms. It also predicts that they are a ’selected’ subgroup exhibiting better
23We thank Benjamin Nefussi of CREST-INSEE for computing this figure for us.
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performance that other firms. In this respect, an obvious measure of performance is firm size.
Hence, our sixth check computes the size advantage of exporters as the percentage difference (’premium’)
between exporters’ and non-exporters’ domestic sales. We observe that exporters in the EAE dataset have
a 149.35% advantage compared to non-exporters (i.e. the ratio of average domestic sales of exporters and
non-exporters in 2.49). The model predicts a 119.26% size advantage.
Productivity advantage of exporters. Our seventh and last check considers firm productivity as this is
the performance measure that our model stresses as the underlying determinant of firm size. The productivity
advantage is measured by the percentage difference (’premium’) between exporters’ and non-exporters’ TFP.
For this calculation we rely again on the OP estimates. We obtain that the productivity advantage of
exporters over firms serving only the French market is equal to 7.92% in the EAE data. This is much lower
than the 259.38% premium predicted by our model.
As our model seems to fail on this last check, it is worth noting that it is a common feature to models
with firm heterogeneity, as we discuss in Section 2.4.2. Two concurrent reasons can be mentioned. On the
one hand, heterogeneous firms models predict that the least productive exporter is more productive than
the most productive non-exporter. Yet this ’strict sorting property’ does not hold empirically, and Armenter
and Koren (2009) show that it accounts for the severe overprediction of the size advantage in US firm sales
data. Of course, the same argument applies to predictions of the productivity advantage. On the other
hand, the overprediction of the productivity advantage may also be due to the fact that our French data are
left-censored. Only firms with 20 employees or more are recorded in the EAE database. Due to the Pareto
assumption this does not matter for our TFP estimates, but it biases the observed size and productivity
advantages downwards. In particular, the 24,461 firms in the EAE database represent about 10% of the
251,357 manufacturing firms active in France in the year 2000. As many as 73.16% of the EAE firms are
exporters. However, when we truncate our simulated firm distribution to get that 73.16% of firms export,
we predict that exporters are only 15.83% more productive than the average firm, which is much closer to
what is observed in the data.
One may also wonder why we simultaneously overpredict the productivity advantage and (slightly) un-
derpredict the size advantage of exporters, given that domestic sales and measured productivity are closely
related in the model and in the data. The properties of both advantage measures in the model can shed
light on this issue. Both advantages are convex and decreasing functions of the underlying cost parameter
c. But productivity has an infinite support, while sales revenues have a finite support since marginal utility
is bounded. For instance, a zero cost firm from country h would have infinite productivity but finite sales
equal to L(chh)2/4η. Therefore our model is less likely to underpredict the productivity advantage than the
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size advantage of exporters. While, of course, overpredicting the former and underpredicting the latter is by
no means a necessary outcome, it is nevertheless an outcome consistent with our model.24
2.4.2 Comparison with other models
In the previous subsection we have shown that our model satisfactorily passes six validation checks out of
seven. We have also explained why it may find the seventh check more challenging. Before using our model
as a tool to evaluate different trade policy scenarios, it is nonetheless important to evaluate its performance
against alternative analytical frameworks also featuring firm heterogeneity.
In this respect, the first natural alternative is the model by Bernard et al. (2003). This model predicts
that 51% of US firms export, compared with an observed 21%. In contrast our model predicts a 25.01%
share of exporting firms to be compared to the observed 22.26% share. As for the size and productivity
advantages of exporters, Bernard et al. (2003) use them to calibrate their model and, therefore, those premia
cannot be used to validate its predictions. Lastly, their model does a better job in matching the fraction of
revenues from export for low export intensity firms, but severely underpredicts productivity dispersion.25
A second alternative is the model by Melitz (2003) that, in the absence of fixed cost data, can be calibrated
on the observed share of exporters. Let us first consider the implied size advantage of exporters. Calibrating
the Melitz model on our data (with a price elasticity of demand between 5 and 10) generates an implausible
high size premium in the [343%, 5177%] range.26 In contrast, our model yields a 119.26% premium which
is much closer to the observed 149.35%. Second, the Melitz model fails to match the (revenue-based) TFP
advantage. In particular, with its constant markups, the Melitz model predicts identical revenue-based pro-
ductivity across all firms. This is clearly rejected by the data. In contrast, our model endogenizes markup
differences across firms. Lastly, the Melitz model also overpredicts the productivity advantage of exporters
as we do. As already argued, this may be partly due to the ’strict sorting’ property of the two models. Ar-
menter and Koren (2009) show that, due indeed to the strict sorting property, the Melitz model overpredicts
the actual sales revenue advantage by a factor 21 in US data.27
In sum, our model picks up important qualitative features of data on export, productivity, and sales, with
24Concerning the role of γ, straightforward calculations show that the productivity advantage decreases and the size advantage
increases with γ. Therefore a higher value of γ can potentially improve the fit of our model on these two ’targets’. In Section
4 we present a robustness check with a higher value of γ borrowed from Bernard et al. (2003).
25In a robustness check reported in Section 4 we set the Pareto shape parameter γ = 3.6 as in Bernard et al. (2003). The
model’s fit is similar to the baseline specification, but our predicted productivity advantage fits the data better (a 47.17%
premium). This suggests that their and our paper face a tradeoff between matching moments of the TFP distribution and
matching productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters.
26Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) conclude that [5, 10] is the most plausible range, after a survey of several studies that
estimate price elasticities using different methods and different datasets.
27While heterogeneity across firms in trade costs, as in Armenter and Koren (2009) or Eaton et al. (2008), could help solving
this problem, the resulting model would become much less tractable and more difficult to calibrate.
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a quantitative fit that is comparable to that of the model by Bernard et al. (2003) and arguably better than
a calibrated version of the model by Melitz (2003). In particular, our fit of the size advantage of exporters
is actually remarkably good, compared to other available calibrations/estimations (Armenter and Koren,
2009).
3 Counterfactual Scenarios
Having estimated and validated our model, we can now use it to simulate the effects industry by industry
of trade frictions in different counterfactual scenarios. This is achieved by recomputing for each country
the remoteness associated with a counterfactual trade freeness matrix P∗ while keeping the exogenous com-
petitiveness and the shape parameters at the values computed in the benchmark scenario. The resulting
remoteness rh∗
(
P∗, ψ1, ..., ψM
)
is then substituted into (17) to obtain the percentage changes in the cutoff
costs. These in turn map into percentage changes in average productivity, delivered costs, markups, prices,
quantities sold and profits that we are able to quantify by (14), as well as into variations in the number
of available varieties and welfare that we are able to sign by (15) and (16) respectively. In particular, (14)
implies the following relation between average performance variables and cutoff cost changes:
mh∗ −mh
mh
=
µh∗ − µh
µh
=
qh∗ − qh
qh
=
mh∗ −mh
mh
,
pih∗ − pih
pih
=
(
mh∗
)2 − (mh)2(
mh
)2 (25)
where the asterisk labels counterfactual values. Moreover, according to (15) and (16), the number of varieties
sold in a country and the welfare of its residents change in the opposite direction of its cutoff cost.
We introduce four counterfactual experiments in which we compute changes in cutoff costs and per-
formance variables. For all the counterfactual experiments, we report the percentage effects on both the
endogenous competitiveness 1/mh and the average cutoff cost mh. However, since these variables are closely
related to each other, for parsimony we restrict our comments to the former variable, emphasising produc-
tivity (TFP) changes as we keep factor costs unchanged.
Non-Europe. As already mentioned, in 2000 59.2% of the imports and 58% of the exports of EU-15
countries concerned other EU-15 countries. This high level of European trade integration was achieved
not just by eliminating all tariff barriers within the EU, but also by introducing mutual recognition of EU
products, legal harmonization and other non-tariff barriers liberalization measures. What would be the cost
of undoing these measures? In Section 3.1 we consider the counterfactual situation where intra-EU trade
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barriers would be set as the same level as with the rest of the world (RoW). This counterfactual experiment
captures what the European Commission’s 1988 Cecchini Report (European Commission, 1998) referred to
as the ’costs of non-Europe’: the foregone benefits of not having a single European market.
Tariff 1: External Tariff. As mentioned in the Introduction, the temptation of protectionism in the
aftermath of the crisis looms large. As this temptation rises for a large number of policy-makers, including
European ones, a possibility is that countries will end up introducing new external tariffs or some other sort
of trade barrier. In Section 3.2 we examine what would have happened, had the EU-15 and RoW countries
introduced an external across-the-board tariff of 5% while leaving intra-EU trade barriers unchanged. In
this scenario trade costs τ lh ≡ (ρlh)−1/γ are increased by 5% if l 6= h and if either l or h are outside the
EU-15.
Tariff 2: External and Internal Tariff. Of further interest is the study of further protectionism among
EU member states. We next consider a combination of a 5% internal EU-15 tariff with a 5% common
external tariff. In Section 3.3 we examine a counterfactual increase of all trade costs τ lh ≡ (ρlh)−1/γ by 5%
whenever l 6= h.
Intra- vs Inter-national trade. Finally, in Section 3.4 we look at the effect of either a 5% international
or intra-national trade costs decrease and compare the two sets of results. For data availability reasons, we
focus on the case of a large European country (France) that is divided up into its 21 NUTS2 continental
regions. The goal of such an exercise is to compare the relative importance of inter- and intra-national trade
in terms of the productivity gains from trade. In a world where the media and policy makers seem to be
mainly concerned with what happens at the global level, it might be useful to remind them of the importance
of intra-national trade barriers.
3.1 Non-Europe
In this section we look at the impact on endogenous competitiveness of an increase in intra-EU-15 trade
frictions at the same level of those between the EU-15 and the RoW. Specifically, we examine changes in
θEUB as defined in Equation (20). We counterfactually set the border-related parameter θ
EU
B = 0 and change
the trade freeness matrix accordingly. Other trade frictions related to distance or language barriers are
unaffected. Our experiment can, therefore, be thought of as the undoing of tariff and non-tariff barriers
liberalization within the EU-15, when other trade costs are kept constant.
Note that our estimates of θEUB are positive and significant (at the 5% confidence level) in 13 out of the
25
18 industries considered. This result strongly indicates that intra-EU trade indeed benefits from lower trade
frictions. In the other cases, θEUB is not significantly different from zero or, for the Professional and Scientific
Equipment industry, it is negative and significant suggesting that there might be something special about
this sector. In what follows we consider changes in endogenous competitiveness, average costs, cutoffs, etc.,
in the 13 industries for which there is strong evidence of higher intra-EU trade integration only.
The second and third columns in Table 9 report the simulated percentage changes in EU-15 endogenous
competitiveness 1/mh and average cutoff costs mh with respect to the benchmark estimation. Changes are
computed by country-sector and averaged at the country level using the value of production as a sector
weight. Similarly the second and third columns of Table 10 report the simulated percentage changes in
endogenous competitiveness and average cutoff costs by industry. Changes are computed by country-sector
and averaged at the sectoral level using the value of production as a country weight.
We can draw two lessons from Table 9. First, undoing behind-the-border integration in the EU-15 has
sizeable costs. The average EU-15 country incurs a 7.02% permanent loss to average TFP, and an equivalent
increase in average prices, markups and output. Using each country’s share of EU-15 manufacturing output
as weights, this corresponds to an aggregate 3.18% productivity loss. As for profits, by aggregating across
EU-15 countries, we get a 6.57% reduction.
Second, losses vary substantially by country and by industry. A cross-country comparison suggests that
peripheral EU-15 countries, such as Ireland, Finland, Portugal and Spain lose the most. Among central
countries, smaller countries such as Belgium, Austria, or Denmark lose more than larger countries such as
Germany, Great Britain or France. The quantitative lesson is that productivity losses to small peripheral
countries, such as Ireland, can be one order of magnitude above losses to large central countries such as Great
Britain or Germany. Losses vary substantially across industries too. Quantitatively, differences amount to
up to one order of magnitude, from a 0.47% loss in average productivity in the Printing and Publishing
industry, to a 8.39% loss to the Leather Products and Footwear industry. Qualitatively, industries with
lower trade costs (i.e. lower magnitude of δl) lose more than the others. Finally, Table 9 reveals that the
RoW would be positively affected by the undoing of EU-15 integration. This is due to the fact that the
EU-15 space would become less competitive with firms from other countries being able to break even more
easily thanks to higher prices.
How do we interpret this border-related counterfactual analysis in terms of changes in actual trade
barriers? One can expect border effects to vary with country size and geography, as shown by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003), but do border effects reflect legal obstacles to trade? Evidence is mixed. On the
one hand, Head and Mayer (2000) show that non-tariff barriers to trade do not explain border effects in
Europe while Hillberry (1999) finds little evidence that tariffs, regulations, information and communication
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costs are related to border effects either. On the other hand, Chen (2004) shows that technical barriers to
trade (TBTs) play a significant role in explaining the border effects, using data collected by the European
Commission in 78 of the 246 manufacturing industries that compose the Nace rev.1 classification. Our
counterfactual experiment may therefore be interpreted as a re-introduction of TBTs, as could for example
result from abandoning the principle of mutual recognition of products.
3.2 Tariff 1: Higher Tariffs Between the EU-15 and the Rest of the World
The fourth and fifth columns of Tables 9 and 10 report the losses from the introduction of a 5% external
tariff by both the EU-15 (as a whole) and the RoW countries. The average EU-15 country experiences a
0.49% loss in productivity, and an equivalent increase in average prices, markups and output. Weighted
by each country’s share of production, this corresponds to an aggregate 0.26% loss in productivity. The
corresponding aggregate figure for profits is a 0.52% reduction. As for the RoW, its aggregate loss is larger
(0.91%) reflecting the preferential nature of the tariff introduction that leaves trade frictions between EU-15
countries unaffected. Differences between EU-15 countries mostly follow the same pattern as the costs of
non-Europe. An exception is Austria where productivity actually increases as a result of the 5% tariff. This
is likely to come from beneficial trade diversion, in the sense that the counterfactual remoteness rh∗ now
favours trade with the closer and relatively competitive Central European countries.
Likewise, average productivity losses vary substantially across industries, ranging from a 2.03% loss in the
Other Manufacturing category to a −0.10% gain in the Transport Equipment industry. It is worth stressing
that, although we work with a partial equilibrium model with exogenous factor costs, some sectors gain
while other lose with differences being up to one order of magnitude. Trade policy changes have important
distributional consequences, even when traditional theoretical channels for increases in inequality (like factor
re-allocation across industries) are not considered.
3.3 Tariff 2: Higher Tariffs Between any Pair of Countries
The sixth and seventh columns of Tables 9 and 10 report the losses in average productivity due to a further 5%
internal tariff among EU-15 partners. The average EU-15 country experiences a 2.17% loss in productivity,
and an equivalent increase in average prices, markups and output. Weighted by each country’s share of
production, this maps into an aggregate 1.25% loss in productivity which is five times larger than in the
previous case. The corresponding aggregate figure for profits is a 2.54% reduction. These results shed light
on how the cost of protectionism could be much higher were EU-15 trade relationships also affected.
Once again, average productivity losses to individual countries vary by more than an order of magnitude,
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from a 0.32% decrease in average British productivity to a 5.67% decrease in Irish productivity. Interestingly,
Austria now experiences a loss, not a gain, from the compounded effect of both internal and external tariffs.
Losses tend to be greater for peripheral, small countries. Similarly, cross-industry heterogeneity is substantial,
with losses ranging from 0.20% in the Printing and Publishing industry to 2.88% in the Other Manufacturing
industry.
3.4 Inter- vs Intra-National Trade
This counterfactual requires that we adapt our procedure to two important data constraints. First, regional
price indices are rarely available and France is no exception. We are, therefore, unable to estimate the cutoff
cost in a region using its average producer price. For this reason we investigate the relative importance of
inter- and intra-national trade in a thought experiment, in which each French region is initially attributed the
national cutoff cost of France. This situation would arise if, for instance, factor rewards were proportional
to local productivity in all regions.
Second, trade flows by industry are not available for French regions, so we cannot apply the gravity
regression (20) to origin-destination pairs involving those regions. We circumvent this limitation by building
on the results by Combes et al. (2005). Using data on trade across French regions for the whole manufacturing
sector, Combes et al. (2005) provide several gravity specifications and overall find a distance elasticity in
line with what is usually obtained in comparable estimations based on international data. We thus use
our previously estimated coefficients for distance (as well as those for language, contiguity, and borders) to
reconstruct the trade freeness between French regions and our group of countries using compatible distance
measures.28 As for trade freeness between French regions, we use our coefficients of the distance elasticity
while borrowing from Combes et al. (2005) the values of the contiguity and border parameters associated
to regional trade.29
Together with the shape parameters previously estimated from Amadeus data and the regional popula-
tions obtained from Eurostat, our initial endogenous competitiveness and the reconstructed trade freeness
can be used as usual to recover the underlying exogenous competitiveness ψl and perform a counterfactual
analysis. Table 11 displays the results. First, a 5% decrease in inter-national trade costs across all countries
have a stronger effect on French regional productivity than a 5% decrease in intra-national trade frictions.
The average French region experiences a 6.64% productivity gain from lower inter-national trade costs and,
averaging across regions using gross regional products (GRP) as weights, this translates into a 4.15% pro-
ductivity gain for France as a whole. This compares to a 2.42% productivity gain for the average French
28See Corcos et al. (2007) for additional details.
29We consider parameter values from column 1 of Table 6 in Combes et al. (2005).
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region, and an aggregate gain of 1.41% for France, in the case of lower intra-national trade costs across these
regions.30
Second, gains in both scenarios vary substantially across regions. Not surprisingly, central regions gain
more from changes in intra-national trade costs: the 6.16% and 4.12% productivity gains of Limousin and
Picardie contrast with the 1.01% and 0.68% gains of Nord-Pas de Calais and Rhoˆne-Alpes, respectively. In
turn, border regions gain more from decreased international trade costs with, for example, Alsace (17.25%)
and Basse-Normandie (13.23%) enjoying higher benefits than Rhoˆne-Alpes (1.97%) and Centre (4.84% gain).
We also find that gains from reduced intra-national trade barriers are negatively correlated with per capita
GRP, while the correlation is positive for gains from reduced inter-national frictions. Greater Paris (Ile de
France) stands as an outlier, benefiting very little in both scenarios because of the large gap in size and
exogenous competitiveness with other regions.
4 Robustness Checks
Our results are robust to alternative trade costs and productivity measures. Percentage changes in the
endogenous competitiveness of European countries (as well as RoW) and French regions are shown in Tables
12 and 13 respectively. For each counterfactual scenario we compare the results obtained in the previous
Section with those obtained in the various robustness checks.31
Trade Costs Estimations: OLS. The PPML estimator used to recover the trade costs from (20) has
many advantages with respect to OLS implemented on the log-linearized model. However, while PPML
is relatively new in the literature, it is well known that it delivers quite different results from OLS. In
particular, the distance elasticity obtained by PPML is usually smaller than that obtained by OLS and one
may wonder whether and how this would affect our findings. Results show that the magnitude of losses
and gains is smaller under the OLS specification, the reason being that our theoretical model delivers larger
changes when trade costs are small. Indeed, OLS provide higher magnitudes for the gravity parameters and
a freeness matrix P pointing to higher levels of trade barriers.
Productivity Estimations: LP. One key drawback of the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology and
its refinements is that it restricts production function estimations to the sample of firms with positive
30Though this quantitative balance is in favour of inter-national trade, a more thoughtful comparison should also consider
the various costs and political difficulties associated with the implementation of the two types of trade barriers reductions. It
is beyond the scope of our analysis to provide a quantitative figure for those costs.
31Apart from the robustness checks discussed in this section, we have experimented also with different distance and common
language indicators (see Appendix B). The corresponding results are available upon request and are virtually identical to the
ones reported here.
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investments. This reduces considerably the number of available firms while introducing a possible selection
bias. In order to check the robustness of our results, we use the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology
(LP) that requires intermediate inputs consumption to be positive thus imposing a much weaker selection
constraint. Following the same procedure as in Section 2.2, we first apply this technique to estimate c˜l(c)
and then recover the shape parameter γ from the distribution of cˆl(c). Results are extremely close to those of
the baseline specification thus suggesting that the productivity estimation technique does not play a major
role in our analysis.
Measurement Error in Value Added: BEJK. An issue raised by Bernard et al. (2003) is that
value added at the firm level is likely to be measured with error. Value added is the dependent variable
in the estimation of productivity. Measurement error in the dependent variable is not an issue for the
consistency of the production function parameter estimates. It may be, instead, an issue for the estimation
of c˜(c). Specifically, being measured as a residual, c˜(c) is likely to display a much higher variance due to
measurement error. In our model the shape parameter γ is inversely related to the variance of the UIR
distribution and might be, therefore, underestimated. In order to provide insights on the potential bias for
our results, we experiment with a higher value of γ = 3.6 borrowed from Bernard et al. (2003).32 Losses in
the counterfactual scenario of Non-Europe are very close. However, the magnitude of losses and gains in all
the 5% trade costs increase and decrease counterfactuals are larger. This is due the fact that, a given change
in trade costs τ lh ≡ (ρlh)−1/γ maps into a different change in trade freeness ρlh depending on the value of γ.
The higher value of γ = 3.6 magnifies the impact of changes in τ lh so inducing larger productivity variations.
5 Conclusion
We have suggested how standard computable equilibrium models of trade policy could be enriched with
selection effects. This has been achieved by carefully estimating and simulating a partial equilibrium model
derived from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Applying the model to EU countries we have shown that changes
in internal or external trade barriers have relevant welfare effects through their impacts on average produc-
tivity, markups, prices, firm scale and product variety.
We believe that our analysis provides enough ground to support the inclusion of firm heterogeneity and
selection effects in the standard toolkit of trade policy evaluation. The next step would be to embed our
partial equilibrium approach into existing computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.
32In Bernard et al. (2003), the lowest cost exporter is the only supplier to any destination. If all potential exporters draw their
productivity from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter γ, then the productivity distribution of the lowest cost exporter
is Fre´chet, with shape parameter γ (see Norman et al., 1994). Bernard et al. (2003) directly assume that the productivity
distribution of the lowest cost exporter is Fre´chet and calibrate the value of γ.
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A Appendix: Estimation of Firm-Level UIR
The two main issues we address in the estimation of firm-level UIR are: simultaneity and price dispersion.
Simultaneity. The simultaneity problem stems from the fact that information on the actual level of c,
although unknown to the econometrician, is to some extent included in the information set of the firm when
the decision concerning the amount of inputs is made. If this is the case, the estimated production function
parameters obtained by applying simple OLS to a logarithmic transformation of (3) are biased due to the
correlation between the regressors and the error term. To tackle this problem, we estimate c using a semi-
parametric approach, as suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). As both
OP and LP assume that labour is a fully variable input, we use the more realistic correction suggested by
Ackerberg et al. (2006). For more details on the OP and LP routines, as well as on how to implement
the ACF correction, the reader is redirected to Del Gatto et al. (2010). Our estimation strictly follows the
description in their Section 5.2.1.
Omitted price bias. Productivity estimation at the firm level would require detailed information on
physical output. This is very seldom available in firm level datasets, so that the production function param-
eters are commonly estimated on the basis of firms’ revenue or value added instead of produced quantities.
Although common in the empirical literature, this introduces a bias in the estimates, as long as the reference
market structure is not perfectly competitive.
To gain insights on this omitted price bias, it is worth abstracting from the simultaneity bias and write
the estimating version of the log of equation (3) as follows (dropping firms’ and countries’ indexes to simplify
notation):
va =
1
c
+ xβ + e (26)
where va denotes firm’s revenues (which equals value added in our model), β is the vector of production
function coefficients, x is the (1 × L) vector of inputs, and e is an iid stochastic disturbance capturing
measurement errors and other idiosyncratic shocks. The OLS estimator of β is:
β˜OLS = (x′x)−1 x′va
where, following the notation introduced in Section (2.2), β˜OLS is the OLS estimator of the ”revenue based”
coefficients β˜. Bearing in mind that va = q + p, the probability limit of β˜OLS can be written as:
plimN→∞(β˜OLS) ≡ β˜ = β + plimN→∞
[
(x′x)−1 x′p
]
(27)
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where N is the number of observations, p is the vector of individual prices and we have assumed orthogonality
in the error. The second term on the right hand side is the omitted price bias. To make the direction of this
bias more explicit, it is worth thinking of it as the OLS estimator of vector ξ in the auxiliary regressions
p = xξ + u (28)
where u is an orthogonal error term. Accordingly, we can write:
plimN→∞(β˜OLS) = β + ξ (29)
so that in the limit:
plimN→∞(
1
c˜
) = va− x plimN→∞(β˜OLS) = 1
c
− xξ
where c˜ is the ”revenue based” estimated UIR and xξ is the omitted price bias.
As long as the theoretical framework provides a negative relationship between prices and quantity of
inputs in (28), the associated bias is a decreasing function of c. To see this in our model, use the production
function (3) to replace for quantity in (1). This yields:
pl(c) =
α− ηQl
Ll
− υ
Ll
1
c
xl(c) (30)
Equation (30) clearly shows that the omitted price bias is, through the slope parameter (υ/Ll)(1/c), de-
creasing in c. The relationship vanishes when markets are perfectly competitive (υ = 0).33. In other words,
disregarding price dispersion results in understating the productivity of the more productive firms, and this
bias is the higher the less competitive the market is
The inconsistency of the estimator obtained from a production function regression like (26) has been
highlighted by Klette and Griliches (1996), who show how using firms’ (deflated) sales systematically leads
to downward biased returns to scale. Klette and Griliches (1996) provide a remedy but in the absence
of simultaneity. Levinsohn and Melitz (2002) show that, in a CES context with constant markups, semi-
parametric methods (i.e. OP and LP) can be enriched to control for price dispersion, as well as simultaneity.
This approach, recently followed by Del Gatto et al. (2008) and De Loecker (2010) (see Del Gatto et al.,
2010 for a review), is however not appropriate in our framework, as we assume variable markups.
We now turn to the correction to apply in order to get a consistent estimator of γ. The idea consists of
transforming c˜l(c) into an observable auxiliary statistic [cˆl(c)], which is a simple monotone transformation
33Similarly, in a CES context, the relation would be: pl(c) =
(
c/xl(c)
)1/σ (
El/Ql
)
, where σ denotes the elasticity of substi-
tution and E is industry total expenditure.
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of the true UIR and is no longer affected by the omitted price bias.
To illustrate the correction, use (4) and (5) to write c˜l(c) as
c˜l(c) =
2
(
τ llBωl
)−1
c
cll + c
(31)
where cll ≡ ml/(τ llBωl) is the UIR of a firm based in h that is just able to serve the domestic market.
By definition, this firm (i.e. the ”marginal” firm) prices at marginal cost, so that pll(cll) = ml. Thus,
c˜l(cll) = cll/pll(cll) =
(
τ llBωl
)−1
, entailing that (31) can be written as
c˜l(c) =
2c˜l(cll)c
cll + c
(32)
Now, the following transformation of c˜l(c) can be used to obtain an auxiliary observable statistic, which is
based on the estimated revenue based UIR but is no longer a function of the true UIR c:
cˆl(c) =
c˜l(c)
2c˜l(cll)− c˜l(c) . (33)
Indeed, using (32) to substitute for c˜l(c) in (33) yields
cˆl(c) ≡ c
cll
(34)
which is simply the “true” UIR divided by the upper bound of the true UIR distribution.
B Appendix: Data Sources
Gravity measures: Trade flows. Data on trade flows are drawn from the Trade and Production
database (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm), provided by the Centre d’Etude Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The dataset, used in Mayer and Zignago (2005), comprises
trade and production figures in an ISIC 3-digit classification, which is consistent across a large set of countries
over the 1976-2001 period.
Gravity measures: Distance. The distance measures provided by CEPII are in km and can be divided
into simple measures (dist and distcap) and weighted measures (distw and distwces). In all reported
estimations we use distw. In unreported estimations, available upon request, we have tried the other 3
measures obtaining similar results.
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Simple geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and
longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) for the dist variable and
the geographic coordinates of the capital cities for the distcap variable. These two variables incorporate
internal distances (dhh) that (as trade costs) we allow to be non-zero. They are based on the area of a
country as in Head and Mayer (2004). In particular, the formula used to convert area into distance is
dhh = (2/3)
√
areah/pi. This formula models the average distance between a producer and a consumer on a
stylized geography where all producers are centrally located and the consumers uniformly distributed across
a disk-shaped region (see Head and Mayer (2002) for more details).
By contrast, weighted distances use city-level data on distances and the geographic distribution of popu-
lation (in 2004) inside each nation. The basic idea is to calculate the distance between two countries as the
weighted average bilateral distance between their biggest cities with the corresponding weights determined
by the shares of those cities in the overall national populations. This procedure can be used in a totally
consistent way for both national and international distances. Specifically, the general formula developed by
Head and Mayer (2002) to calculate the distance between country l and h is:
dlh =
∑
p∈l
∑
r∈h
(Sp/Sl)(Sr/Sh) (dpr)δ
1/δ (35)
where Sp (Sr) denotes the population of agglomeration p (r) belonging to country l (h). The parameter
δ measures the sensitivity of trade flows to bilateral distance dpr. For the distw variable, δ is set equal to
1. The distwces calculation sets it equal to −1, which corresponds to the usual coefficient estimated from
gravity models.
Gravity measures: Common Language Indicators. For each country, the CEPII provides 3 different
common language indicators. The first one (langoff) considers that two countries share a language if the
language is officially used by the public administrations of both countries. The second one (lang9) attributes
a common language to a country pair if at least 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same
language. Finally, lang20 attributes a common language to a country pair if at least 20% of the population
of both countries speaks the same language. Our preferred measure is langoff but unreported estimations,
available upon request, show that the other two measures lead to similar results.
Firm-level data for productivity estimation. To estimate individual productivity we rely on the
information on value added, capital, labour and investments provided by Bureau Van Dijk in the Amadeus
database, which contains the most comprehensive and accurate information on European firms balance sheets
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data.
This data has been extensively used in recent empirical studies. See, e.g., Helpman et al. (2004) and
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008). The data we use refer to years 1998-2003 and cover 12 out of the 14
European countries group plus Norway. Value added for Greece and Ireland is in fact not available due
to differences in accounting regulations that make balance sheets data not comparable to other European
countries. This confirms the attention paid by Bureau Van Dijk in making data comparable across countries.
The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel of 137,284 observations covering 32,840 firms spanning our
18 manufacturing industries. Details on the sectoral and country coverage are reported in Tables 15 and 14.
Book capital value has been corrected using appropriate industry deflators.
Average producer prices for the domestic cutoff. Data on average producer prices, comparable across
countries at the industry level, are provided by Timmer et al. (2007). The data represent an extension, in
terms of both country coverage and accuracy, of the ICOP database provided by the Groningen GRoWth
and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net). Data are originally available by Nace 2 digit industry and
refer to the year 1997. To convert these data from 1997 to 2000 we use country-industry specific value
added deflators. Finally, to match our 18-industry classification, we weight Nace 2 digit prices in each of
our sectors by total hours worked in 2000. Both are drawn from the Groningen GRoWth and Development
Centre “60-Industry Database”, available on line. The computed mh are listed in Table 3. We report them
with two digits after the decimal point in order to save space.
The EAE database on French firms. The EAE (Enquete Annuelle Entreprises) database is provided
by the SESSI (Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles, French Ministry of Industry) and the SCEES
(Service Central des Enqueˆtes et Etudes Statistiques, French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). We
use this dataset under the authorization of the French Conseil National de l’Information Statistique (CNIS).
EAE provides detailed information on the balance sheets and location of all French manufacturing firms with
more than 20 employees, as well as on a stratified sample of firms with less than 20 employees. It provides
us with information about 24,519 manufacturing French firms, compared to 3,415 in the Amadeus database.
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Table 1: Gravity Estimations.
Industry δ δSC θWB θ
EU
B θLB θCB
Food beverages and tobacco -1.1305** -0.1001** -3.2100** 1.3480** 0.7650** 0.0906
(0.0488) (0.0112) (0.0925) (0.0526) (0.0599) (0.0673)
Textiles -0.5407** 0.0526** -2.4180** 0.6123** 0.6054** 0.5412**
(0.0407) (0.0100) (0.0728) (0.0613) (0.0623) (0.0535)
Wearing apparel except footwear -0.6266** 0.0271 -2.9958** 0.8046** 0.5877** 0.6052**
(0.0698) (0.0152) (0.1444) (0.1125) (0.1061) (0.1052)
Leather products and footwear -0.6997** -0.0574** -1.9472** 0.7099** 0.5977** 0.1675*
(0.0560) (0.0122) (0.1362) (0.0872) (0.1051) (0.0726)
Wood products except furniture -1.4120** -0.0299 -2.2878** 0.0397 0.3803** 0.6460**
(0.0567) (0.0181) (0.1053) (0.0655) (0.0727) (0.0811)
Paper products -1.1430** -0.0017 -1.8850** 0.5925** 0.5301** 0.3766**
(0.0400) (0.0087) (0.0876) (0.0543) (0.0578) (0.0487)
Printing and Publishing -0.9902** -0.0387** -3.3415** 0.2205** 1.2079** 0.5433**
(0.0518) (0.0106) (0.0880) (0.0655) (0.0675) (0.0767)
Petroleum and Coal -1.1866** -0.0266 -2.6312** 0.2727* 0.8139** 0.3654**
(0.0680) (0.0162) (0.1736) (0.1171) (0.1167) (0.1168)
Chemicals -0.8053** -0.0353** -1.4760** 0.4660** 0.5186** 0.0405
(0.0584) (0.0116) (0.0916) (0.0820) (0.1005) (0.0533)
Rubber and plastic -0.9043** -0.0013 -2.4284** 0.5355** 0.5859** 0.4954**
(0.0330) (0.0091) (0.0615) (0.0482) (0.0493) (0.0433)
Other non-metallic mineral products -1.1747** -0.1039** -2.5351** 0.4734** 0.5118** 0.2972**
(0.0384) (0.0098) (0.0786) (0.0477) (0.0474) (0.0531)
Metallic products -0.9130** 0.0075 -1.6281** 0.6305** 0.7832** 0.3076**
(0.0495) (0.0105) (0.0776) (0.0642) (0.0825) (0.0557)
Fabricated metal products -1.0496** -0.0337** -2.1618** 0.0291 0.5388** 0.4793**
(0.0689) (0.0127) (0.0787) (0.0712) (0.1046) (0.0583)
Machinery except electrical -0.9636** -0.0782** -0.8871** 0.1569 0.5798** -0.0750
(0.0800) (0.0145) (0.1106) (0.0986) (0.0756) (0.0920)
Electric machinery -0.7759** -0.0279* -0.9716** 0.1439* 0.4895** 0.2003**
(0.0499) (0.0121) (0.1029) (0.0713) (0.0640) (0.0621)
Professional and scientific equipment -0.5745** -0.0027 -1.0464** -0.2977** 0.3238** 0.1447**
(0.0503) (0.0151) (0.0865) (0.0945) (0.0672) (0.0547)
Transport equipment -1.0421** -0.0358* -0.9118** 0.2082* 0.4231** 0.2524**
(0.0579) (0.0162) (0.0999) (0.0971) (0.0708) (0.0634)
Other manufacturing -0.6119** -0.0247 -2.5569** -0.1764 0.3362** 0.6320**
(0.0630) (0.0148) (0.1401) (0.1055) (0.1002) (0.0854)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, with *, and ** denoting significantly different from zero at, respectively,
the 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 2: Production Function and γ Estimations.
Production function γ estimations on γ estimations on γ estimations on
estimations cˆ: all firms cˆ: French c˜: all firms
non-exporters
Industry βL βK γ R
2 γ R2 γ R2
Food beverages and tobacco 0.5842** 0.2209** 1.7376** 0.9684 1.1337** 0.9268 2.2275** 0.9258
(0.0337) (0.0298) (0.0055) (0.0105) (0.0111)
Textiles 0.7496** 0.1655** 1.7865** 0.8833 1.3462** 0.8577 3.2974** 0.8576
(0.0899) (0.0534) (0.0248) (0.0650) (0.0513)
Wearing apparel except footwear 0.6213** 0.1248 1.4632** 0.9408 2.7282** 0.9185 2.0520** 0.9068
(0.0874) (0.0781) (0.0181) (0.1507) (0.0324)
Leather products and footwear 0.7157** 0.0888 2.3442** 0.9838 1.2975** 0.8167 2.9375** 0.8728
(0.1109) (0.0644) (0.0180) (0.1440) (0.0672)
Wood products except furniture 0.7385** 0.2433** 1.5930** 0.9264 1.8982** 0.9196 3.4348** 0.8701
(0.1059) (0.0845) (0.0191) (0.0294) (0.0566)
Paper products 0.5580** 0.1097* 1.4900** 0.9882 0.9910** 0.8079 2.0369** 0.9445
(0.0800) (0.0493) (0.0069) (0.0719) (0.0210)
Printing and Publishing 0.7797** 0.0394 1.3426** 0.9547 1.4829** 0.9146 2.2488** 0.9362
(0.1081) (0.0562) (0.0108) (0.0244) (0.0218)
Petroleum and Coal 0.3961** 0.3363** 1.0800** 0.9814 0.1606 0.9214 1.3689** 0.8684
(0.1628) (0.1337) (0.0126) (0.0176) (0.0450)
Chemicals 0.7138** 0.1523** 1.3746** 0.9152 0.8960** 0.9589 2.2774** 0.8733
(0.0562) (0.0329) (0.0089) (0.0173) (0.0185)
Rubber and plastic 0.6622** 0.1796** 1.7341** 0.9441 1.8917** 0.9589 3.0755** 0.8683
(0.0619) (0.0429) (0.0125) (0.0307) (0.0355)
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.5687** 0.2477** 1.6183** 0.9020 1.9121** 0.9430 2.6072** 0.8734
(0.0508) (0.0437) (0.0162) (0.0227) (0.0302)
Metallic products 0.5696** 0.2042** 1.7070** 0.9632 0.4059** 0.9677 2.3659** 0.9215
(0.0783) (0.0537) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0244)
Fabricated metal products 0.7260** 0.1084** 1.8104** 0.9608 2.1072** 0.9304 3.2698** 0.8707
(0.0488) (0.0280) (0.0086) (0.0176) (0.0296)
Machinery except electrical 0.7143** 0.1122** 1.6600** 0.9527 1.8306** 0.9489 2.8308** 0.8980
(0.0418) (0.0254) (0.0086) (0.0231) (0.0221)
Electric machinery 0.8021** 0.0986* 1.5496** 0.9185 1.3766** 0.9508 2.6098** 0.8502
(0.0610) (0.0386) (0.0135) (0.0212) (0.0321)
Professional and scientific equipment 0.6629** 0.1446* 1.2944** 0.8813 2.1236** 0.9762 2.3190** 0.7798
(0.1023) (0.0633) (0.0219) (0.0248) (0.0567)
Transport equipment 0.9003** 0.0459 1.4713** 0.9257 1.8080** 0.9856 2.8579** 0.8440
(0.0480) (0.0446) (0.0126) (0.0196) (0.0370)
Other manufacturing 0.8527** 0.0172 1.8500** 0.9710 1.8152** 0.9624 3.0416** 0.8992
(0.0575) (0.0603) (0.0104) (0.0208) (0.0331)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, with *, and ** denoting significantly different from zero at, respectively, the 5% and 1%
confidence level.
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Table 4: Endogenous vs Exogenous Competitiveness.
Country Endog. comp. (1/ml) rank Exog. comp. (1/ψl) rank Difference
Austria 12 6 6
Belgium 5 11 -6
Germany 8 12 -4
Denmark 13 8 5
Spain 1 1 0
Finland 9 2 7
France 10 10 0
Great Britain 14 14 0
Greece 2 9 -7
Ireland 6 4 2
Italy 4 7 -3
Netherlands 7 13 -6
Portugal 3 3 0
Sweden 11 5 6
Table 5: Correlation between Prices and Revealed Comparative Advantage.
Country Correlation
Austria 0.41
Belgium -0.25
Denmark -0.51
Finland -0.29
France 0.42
Germany -0.02
Great Britain -0.48
Greece 0.09
Ireland 0.14
Italy -0.26
Netherlands -0.29
Portugal -0.35
Spain -0.55
Sweden -0.60
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Table 6: Theory-based vs Standard Gravity by Industry.
Theory-based Gravity Standard Gravity
Industry Coeff. N lP Coeff. L
h Pseudo R2 Coeff. GDP l Coeff. GDPh Pseudo R2
Food beverages and tobacco 0.3104 1.0915 0.9840 0.4312 0.5703 0.9858
Textiles 0.6006 0.7647 0.9635 0.5753 0.5587 0.9464
Wearing apparel except footwear 0.5026 0.8586 0.9556 0.3007 0.6471 0.9254
Leather products and footwear 0.6954 0.8183 0.9365 0.3561 0.5963 0.7911
Wood products except furniture 0.2566 0.8447 0.9697 0.2010 0.6933 0.9603
Paper products 0.0923 1.0788 0.9717 0.4555 0.6904 0.9654
Printing and Publishing 0.6295 0.6428 0.9902 0.7002 0.4837 0.9931
Chemicals 0.7403 1.0592 0.9555 0.6797 0.6568 0.9658
Rubber and plastic 0.6444 0.8817 0.9873 0.6511 0.5908 0.9852
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.6291 0.9886 0.9849 0.4951 0.5463 0.9744
Metallic products 0.5922 1.0950 0.9693 0.5538 0.6551 0.9630
Fabricated metal products 0.7879 0.7613 0.9810 0.6173 0.5902 0.9790
Machinery except electrical 0.7245 0.8333 0.9488 0.7926 0.7266 0.9506
Electric machinery 0.5925 0.9483 0.9179 0.8250 0.7701 0.9472
Professional and scientific equipment 0.4441 0.7941 0.9389 0.9375 0.7316 0.9653
Transport equipment 0.7560 0.9766 0.9442 0.7805 0.7764 0.9582
Other manufacturing 0.4606 0.9519 0.9493 0.4712 0.6961 0.9581
Average 0.5564 0.9053 0.9617 0.5779 0.6459 0.9538
Table 7: Correlation between Observed and Predicted Number of Firms by Industry.
Industry Correlation
Food beverages and tobacco 0.2661
Textiles 0.7178
Wearing apparel except footwear 0.4369
Leather products and footwear 0.8322
Wood products except furniture -0.2276
Paper products 0.3210
Printing and Publishing 0.6044
Chemicals 0.5150
Rubber and plastic 0.7211
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.4701
Metallic products 0.6586
Fabricated metal products 0.3806
Machinery except electrical 0.5974
Electric machinery 0.5147
Professional and scientific equipment 0.4617
Transport equipment 0.6163
Other manufacturing 0.2193
Average 0.4768
Table 8: Frequency of Export Intensity.
Export intensity of exporters in % Observed France Our Simulations
0 to 10 69.2 26.0
10 to 20 12.3 13.1
20 to 30 6.7 10.7
30 to 40 4.1 7.1
40 to 50 2.2 5.5
50 to 60 1.4 5.0
60 to 70 0.8 6.2
70 to 80 0.4 8.2
80 to 90 0.3 11.6
90 to 100 2.6 6.6
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Table 9: Non-Europe, Tariff 1, and Tariff 2 Costs by Country: EU-15 and RoW.
costs of Non-Europe costs of Tariff 1 costs of Tariff 2
Country % decr. 1/m¯ % incr. m¯ % decr. 1/m¯ % incr. m¯ % decr. 1/m¯ % incr. m¯
Austria 5.57 5.90 -0.13 -0.13 1.88 1.92
Belgium 7.74 8.39 0.14 0.14 2.58 2.65
Denmark 4.76 5.00 0.46 0.46 1.88 1.91
Finland 7.65 8.28 1.31 1.33 3.54 3.67
France 2.13 2.17 0.10 0.10 0.71 0.72
Germany 1.37 1.38 0.05 0.05 0.40 0.40
Great Britain 0.55 0.55 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.32
Greece 5.02 5.29 0.81 0.81 2.11 2.15
Ireland 12.59 14.41 1.20 1.22 5.67 6.01
Italy 3.64 3.78 0.40 0.40 1.75 1.78
Netherlands 4.58 4.80 0.10 0.10 1.10 1.11
Portugal 7.48 8.09 1.18 1.19 3.27 3.38
Spain 7.16 7.71 0.83 0.84 3.01 3.10
Sweden 5.30 5.60 0.32 0.32 2.20 2.25
EU-15 3.18 3.37 0.26 0.26 1.25 1.28
RoW -0.61 -0.60 0.91 0.98 0.78 0.83
Table 10: Non-Europe, Tariff 1, and Tariff 2 Costs by Industry: EU-15 only.
costs of Non-Europe costs of Tariff 1 costs of Tariff 2
Industry % decr. 1/m¯ % incr. m¯ % decr. 1/m¯ % incr. m¯ % decr. 1/m¯ % incr. m¯
Food beverages and tobacco 3.53 3.66 0.32 0.32 0.71 0.71
Textiles 7.17 7.72 0.08 0.08 1.65 1.68
Wearing apparel except footwear 6.36 6.80 0.07 0.07 0.99 1.00
Leather products and footwear 8.39 9.16 0.20 0.20 2.56 2.63
Wood products except furniture — — 0.09 0.09 1.06 1.07
Paper products 5.39 5.69 0.09 0.09 0.99 1.00
Printing and Publishing 0.47 0.47 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.20
Petroleum and Coal 1.20 1.21 0.05 0.05 0.32 0.32
Chemicals 6.56 7.02 0.57 0.57 1.81 1.84
Rubber and plastic 4.51 4.73 0.98 0.99 1.89 1.93
Other non-metallic mineral products 2.66 2.73 0.38 0.38 0.93 0.94
Metallic products 8.23 8.97 0.17 0.17 1.83 1.86
Fabricated metal products — — 0.21 0.22 0.97 0.98
Machinery except electrical — — 0.29 0.29 1.57 1.59
Electric machinery 2.49 2.55 -0.09 -0.09 1.27 1.28
Professional and scientific equipment — — -0.07 -0.07 1.20 1.21
Transport equipment 3.76 3.91 -0.10 -0.10 1.30 1.32
Other manufacturing — — 2.03 2.07 2.88 2.97
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Table 11: The Relative Importance of Inter- and Intra-National Trade for France.
Code French Region Per capita GRP 5% decr. inter-national frictions 5% decr. intra-national frictions
(France=100) % incr. 1/m¯ % decr. m¯ % incr. 1/m¯ % decr. m¯
FR10 Ile de France 154.80 0.54 0.54 0.14 0.14
FR21 Champagne-Ardennes 93.55 9.96 9.06 4.56 4.36
FR22 Picardie 80.65 7.92 7.34 4.12 3.95
FR23 Haute-Normandie 90.86 6.46 6.06 2.44 2.38
FR24 Centre 88.46 4.84 4.61 2.77 2.69
FR25 Basse-Normandie 81.52 13.23 11.68 3.11 3.01
FR26 Bourgogne 87.46 8.56 7.88 3.57 3.45
FR31 Nord-Pas de Calais 77.09 3.17 3.08 1.01 1.00
FR41 Lorraine 81.48 8.09 7.48 1.74 1.71
FR42 Alsace 98.08 17.25 14.71 1.96 1.92
FR43 Franche-Comte´ 87.66 9.73 8.87 3.94 3.79
FR51 Pays de la Loire 89.30 3.80 3.66 1.31 1.29
FR52 Bretagne 85.22 6.40 6.02 1.46 1.44
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 81.58 6.33 5.95 2.77 2.69
FR61 Aquitaine 87.98 3.63 3.51 1.40 1.38
FR62 Midi-Pyre´ne´es 86.38 3.78 3.65 1.55 1.52
FR63 Limousin 80.96 9.11 8.35 6.16 5.80
FR71 Rhoˆne-Alpes 100.28 1.97 1.93 0.68 0.67
FR72 Auvergne 82.75 7.37 6.86 3.46 3.34
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 76.10 4.57 4.37 1.89 1.86
FR82 PACA 91.05 2.78 2.70 0.84 0.84
France 100.00 4.15 3.99 1.41 1.39
Table 12: Robustness checks: Non-Europe, Tariff 1, and Tariff 2 Costs by Country: EU-15 and RoW.
costs of Non-Europe costs of Tariff 1 costs of Tariff 2
% decr. 1/m¯ % decr. 1/m¯ % decr. 1/m¯
Country Baseline OLS LP BEJK Baseline OLS LP BEJK Baseline OLS LP BEJK
Austria 5.57 2.62 8.63 5.47 -0.13 -0.19 -0.16 0.78 1.88 0.77 1.88 3.20
Belgium 7.74 2.18 9.69 7.82 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.92 2.58 0.97 2.66 4.77
Denmark 7.65 2.22 6.61 4.28 1.31 0.05 0.45 2.04 3.54 0.79 1.88 3.59
Finland 1.37 2.90 9.92 8.21 0.05 0.27 1.32 5.53 0.40 1.37 3.61 8.28
France 0.55 1.48 2.57 1.79 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.58 0.32 0.74 0.74 1.67
Germany 4.76 1.03 1.85 1.67 0.46 0.00 0.04 0.43 1.88 0.39 0.41 1.19
Great Britain 5.02 0.25 0.71 0.47 0.81 0.02 0.14 0.56 2.11 0.18 0.33 0.90
Greece 12.59 0.79 5.47 5.81 1.20 0.12 0.87 4.29 5.67 0.49 2.25 6.68
Ireland 3.64 6.56 16.79 14.32 0.40 0.13 1.21 4.41 1.75 2.32 5.73 10.32
Italy 4.58 2.18 5.16 5.67 0.10 0.11 0.43 2.56 1.10 1.38 1.89 5.76
Netherlands 7.48 1.88 5.47 4.84 1.18 0.01 0.10 0.72 3.27 0.61 1.11 2.48
Portugal 7.16 2.13 9.35 9.41 0.83 0.27 1.25 5.04 3.01 1.24 3.43 8.58
Spain 2.13 5.20 8.97 10.46 0.10 0.31 0.87 4.66 0.71 2.19 3.21 9.73
Sweden 5.30 2.86 7.27 4.95 0.32 0.03 0.30 1.91 2.20 1.40 2.26 4.61
EU-15 3.18 1.80 3.19 2.92 0.26 0.06 0.27 1.48 1.25 0.84 1.31 3.36
RoW -0.61 -0.19 -0.59 -0.68 0.91 0.73 0.96 2.24 0.78 0.65 0.82 2.03
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Table 13: Robustness Checks: the Relative Importance of Inter- and Intra-National Trade for France.
5% decr. inter-national frictions 5% decr. intra-national frictions
% incr. 1/m¯ % incr. 1/m¯
Country Baseline OLS LP BEJK Baseline OLS LP BEJK
Ile de France 0.54 0.23 0.61 1.82 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.18
Champagne-Ardennes 9.96 7.39 13.08 10.94 4.56 2.51 4.69 7.48
Picardie 7.92 4.45 10.86 13.67 4.12 3.15 4.20 6.84
Haute-Normandie 6.46 3.05 8.37 11.06 2.44 1.24 2.50 3.73
Centre 4.84 3.00 5.85 7.72 2.77 2.17 2.83 4.31
Basse-Normandie 13.23 6.29 9.03 17.92 3.11 1.60 3.20 4.83
Bourgogne 8.56 4.22 13.14 18.67 3.57 2.21 3.67 5.63
Nord-Pas de Calais 3.17 1.87 3.72 8.91 1.01 0.45 1.04 1.46
Lorraine 8.09 4.40 11.16 12.55 1.74 0.81 1.79 2.56
Alsace 17.25 5.04 8.40 19.65 1.96 0.79 2.02 2.92
Franche-Comte´ 9.73 5.78 10.93 22.71 3.94 1.91 4.06 6.31
Pays de la Loire 3.80 2.17 4.53 9.13 1.31 0.80 1.35 1.91
Bretagne 6.40 3.84 8.39 14.47 1.46 0.79 1.50 2.15
Poitou-Charentes 6.33 2.76 7.98 9.12 2.77 1.61 2.85 4.23
Aquitaine 3.63 1.66 4.20 7.89 1.40 0.79 1.44 2.04
Midi-Pyre´ne´es 3.78 1.56 4.38 7.85 1.55 0.84 1.59 2.27
Limousin 9.11 4.31 10.69 13.51 6.16 2.89 6.38 10.68
Rhoˆne-Alpes 1.97 1.10 2.19 5.17 0.68 0.42 0.69 0.95
Auvergne 7.37 2.78 10.56 9.53 3.46 1.83 3.56 5.40
Languedoc-Roussillon 4.57 1.88 5.39 9.90 1.89 1.03 1.94 2.83
PACA 2.78 1.32 3.12 5.54 0.84 0.45 0.87 1.22
France 4.15 2.06 4.67 7.76 1.41 0.80 1.45 2.16
Table 14: Country Coverage of our Amadeus Dataset.
Country Number of Firms Number of Observations
Austria 441 703
Belgium 1,872 9,227
Denmark 1,022 1,418
Finland 491 3,214
France 5,319 24,261
Germany 1,022 2,659
Great Britain 6,048 26,907
Italy 7,045 34,119
Netherlands 1,222 5,059
Norway 3,168 5,168
Portugal 422 1,032
Spain 3,415 15,901
Sweden 1,641 7,616
Table 15: Industry Coverage of our Amadeus Dataset.
Industry Number of Firms Number of Observations
Food beverages and tobacco 4,905 20,375
Textiles 1,315 5,809
Wearing apparel except footwear 697 3,052
Leather products and footwear 394 1,877
Wood products except furniture 1,142 4,080
Paper products 1,035 4,596
Printing and Publishing 2,012 7,989
Petroleum and Coal 171 799
Chemicals 3,073 13,609
Rubber and plastic 1,779 7,759
Other non-metallic mineral products 1,622 6,905
Metallic products 1,262 5,595
Fabricated metal products 3,104 12,661
Machinery except electrical 3,431 14,397
Electric machinery 2,256 9,305
Professional and scientific equipment 861 3,522
Transport equipment 1,940 7,703
Other manufacturing 1,841 7,251
47
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
0123
.
.
Fo
od
, b
ev
er
ag
es
 a
nd
 to
ba
cc
o
A
TB
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.15.2.25.3
.
.
Te
xt
ile
s
A
TB
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.15.2.25.3.35.4
.
.
W
ea
rin
g 
ap
pa
re
l e
xc
ep
t f
oo
tw
ea
r
A
TB
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.2.25.3.35.4.45
.
.
Le
at
he
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
an
d 
fo
ot
w
ea
r
A
T B
ED
ED
K E
S
FI
FR
G
B G
R
IE
IT
N
L P
T S
E
-30-20-1001020
.
.
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 e
xc
ep
t f
ur
ni
tu
re
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.2.4.6.81
.
.
P
ap
er
 p
ro
du
ct
s
A
T B
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
TS
E
0.511.5
.
.
P
rin
tin
g 
an
d 
P
ub
lis
hi
ng
A
T B
ED
E D
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
TS
E
.2.4.6.81
.
.
P
et
ro
le
um
 a
nd
 c
oa
l
A
T B
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.1.2.3.4.5
.
.
C
he
m
ic
al
s
A
T B
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.2.3.4.5.6.7
.
.
R
ub
be
r a
nd
 p
la
st
ic
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
B G
R
IE
IT
N
L P
TS
E
-50050100
.
.
O
th
er
 n
on
-m
et
al
lic
 m
in
er
al
 p
ro
d.
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.2.3.4.5.6
.
.
M
et
al
lic
 p
ro
du
ct
s
A
T B
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
-20246
.
.
Fa
br
ic
at
ed
 m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.2.4.6.8
.
.
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
xc
ep
t e
le
ct
ric
al
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.15.2.25.3.35
.
.
E
le
ct
ric
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
A
T B
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.14.16.18.2.22
.
.
P
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l a
nd
 s
ci
en
tif
ic
 e
qu
ip
.
A
T B
ED
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
T S
E
.2.4.6.8
.
.
Tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
A
TB
E D
ED
KE
S
FI
FR
G
BG
R
IE
IT
N
LP
TS
E
.15.2.25.3.35
.
.
O
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
fu
rn
itu
re
E
xo
ge
no
us
 C
om
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s 
by
 In
du
st
ry
-C
ou
nt
ry
(a
)
A
T
=
A
u
st
ri
a
;
B
E
=
B
el
g
iu
m
;
D
E
=
G
er
m
a
n
y
;
D
K
=
D
en
m
a
rk
;
E
S
=
S
p
a
in
;
F
I
=
F
in
la
n
d
;
F
R
=
F
ra
n
ce
;
G
B
=
G
re
a
t
B
ri
ta
in
;
G
R
=
G
re
ec
e;
IE
=
Ir
el
a
n
d
;
IT
=
It
a
ly
;
N
L
=
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s;
P
T
=
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l;
S
E
=
S
w
ed
en
.
T
ri
a
n
g
le
s
a
n
d
sq
u
a
re
s
d
ep
ic
t,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y,
th
e
5
th
a
n
d
9
5
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
b
ta
in
ed
b
y
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
in
g
.
F
ig
u
re
1:
E
xo
ge
n
o
u
s
C
o
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
n
es
s
o
f
E
U
-1
5
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
cr
o
ss
th
e
1
8
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
In
d
u
st
ri
es
a
n
d
C
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
In
te
rv
a
ls
.
48
Figure 2: French Regions Productivity Gains (i.e. Increase in 1/m¯) stemming from a 5% Decrease in Inter-
National Trade Frictions.
Figure 3: French Regions Productivity Gains (i.e. Increase in 1/m¯) stemming from a 5% Decrease in Intra-
National Trade Frictions.
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